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Robert F. Goldberg, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2004 
 
 
Concepts are considered to be the building blocks of human higher-order cognition. Yet theories 
differ according to how these semantic representations are instantiated within the brain. The 
amodal characteristics of word meaning imply that this knowledge is stored independent of 
perceptual experiences. However, mounting evidence suggests that concepts depend upon 
cortical regions typically ascribed to sensory input. This embodiment of semantic representations 
through perceptual mechanisms can crucially explain the relationship between the meaning 
conveyed by words and experience with the associated objects. Across two experiments, this 
research used functional MRI to examine the role of sensory and prefrontal brain regions while 
participants verified semantic properties (e.g., sounds loud?; lays eggs?) of word items.  The 
results show that perceptual properties activate the predicted cortical regions associated with 
vision, audition, taste and smell, and touch. Increased response times for these perceptual 
decisions were not associated with increased activity in the identified sensory areas but were 
associated with increased activity in prefrontal brain regions. In contrast, more abstract semantic 
decisions led to increased activity in the prefrontal cortex but no such increases were seen for the 
more difficult decisions. These findings indicate that multiple and widely distributed brain 
regions used to encode perceptual experiences also support semantic knowledge of those sensory 
experiences. The prefrontal cortex may represent abstract knowledge and control retrieval with 
increasing semantic demands for decisions further removed from perceptual experiences. 
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 1. The representation of semantic knowledge: from behavior to brains 
The brain is uniquely tuned to extract words from spoken dialogue and events and directly 
access the underlying meaning. In this regard, Dennett (1984) has called the neural mechanisms 
a “semantic engine”. The converging methodologies of neuropsychology and neuroimaging, 
constrained by classic and contemporary models of categorization and language processing, 
suggest how this knowledge may be instantiated within the human brain. By investigating the 
neural basis of semantic memory, this research examines how the meaning of words is 
represented by specific brain regions depending on the role of those areas in encoding sensory 
input and in verbally mediating information about objects. 
In focusing on one type of semantic representation, namely concrete objects, and their 
associated properties (e.g., ‘tiger’, ‘broccoli’, ‘fur’, ‘lays eggs’, and ‘green’), this dissertation 
research will obviously be limited. But it should be noted that similar conclusions of the 
functional neuroanatomical architecture could apply across a wide range of other stimuli classes 
including verbs (Tyler, Russell, Fadili, & Moss, 2001) and numbers (Le Clec'H et al., 2000). For 
instance, verbs that refer to specific bodily motions are associated with primary motor areas that 
control movements of the indicated body parts (Hauk et al., 2004). And while this review will be 
limited to the structure and processing of semantic memory in areas of the cerebral cortex, it 
should be obvious that subcortical (Middleton & Strick, 1994) and cerebellar (Fiez, 1996) 
regions are likely to play important, yet still to be clarified, semantic functions.  
This introductory chapter will provide a broad overview of how semantic knowledge may be 
instantiated in the brain through the lens of converging methodologies. Seminal behavioral 
models indicate how semantic categories may be reduced to their featural elements based on 
graded relations and the increasing reliance on abstract defining properties when decisions 
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 become more difficult. More contemporary theories predict that object knowledge relies on 
perceptual properties represented in sensory brain regions necessary for encoding experiences 
with the associated objects. This prediction is supported by studies of neuropsychological 
patients which indicate how semantic knowledge may be reduced to the constituent features 
involved based on the roles of dissociable brain regions.  
Depending on the specific clustering of perceptual properties within classes of objects, 
knowledge of some categories, such as living and non-living things, are more likely to be 
impaired with focal brain damage. For instance, lesions to visual brain areas are more likely to 
impair knowledge of objects that rely on visual information. Yet the loss of functional 
information generally spares knowledge of object categories that preferentially depend on visual 
properties. In this regard, neuropsychological case studies provide evidence for how semantic 
knowledge can be specifically tied to particular, but widely distributed, brain regions. In contrast, 
verbally mediated facts about objects appear to depend on prefrontal areas such that even though 
a patient may not be able to identify an item they can still access abstract information about it.  
More recent neuroimaging evidence confirms and extends predictions from the lesion 
studies. Semantic knowledge can be localized to particular regions of the cortex depending upon 
the extent to which a specific category or feature represents visual or functional information. 
Visually-based knowledge activates ventral temporal object recognition areas, whereas facts 
regarding object functions depend on regions in frontoparietal cortex. Other sensory modalities 
appear to similarly rely on cortical regions typically ascribed to sensory experiences of objects. 
The question then arises as to whether perceptual properties of object knowledge in general rely 
on sensory cortical mechanisms (Allport, 1985) and how more demanding perceptual decisions 
regarding object knowledge are resolved. In Chapter 2, the first experiment specifically examines 
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 these questions by investigating whether a distributed set of sensory brain regions supports 
perceptual semantic properties associated with the given modalities.  In addition, by varying the 
difficulty of items in each sensory modality, this initial experiment also tested how these areas 
may be specifically involved as semantic demands increase, and/or are supported by prefrontal 
brain regions. Studies of the prefrontal cortex indicate the specific role of this region in the 
controlled retrieval of semantic knowledge and the representation of abstract rules. However, it 
is not entirely clear whether this prefrontal activity, as suggested from seminal behavioral 
theories,can be explained through increased semantic abstractness or more general semantic 
processing demands. In Chapter 3, the second experiment examines the activity of prefrontal 
regions as the abstractness and demands of semantic decisions were varied. The results of these 
experiments suggest how semantic knowledge is widely distributed throughout the cerebral 
cortex and yet highly interactive as the processing demands of semantic decisions increase.  
 
1.1. Behavioral models of semantic knowledge: Reducing categories to features 
The componential structure of conceptual knowledge is typically examined by investigating 
the relationship between object features and knowledge of semantic categories. The classical 
perspective assumes that categories consist of necessary and sufficient conditions (Katz, 1963). 
In this regard, the way an item is classified as a member of a category is determined by 
considering the essential properties of that item and matching those properties to a two-tier 
feature list of the category. The more recent tradition rejected this explanation in favor of the 
view that category membership is based on graded property relations (Rips, Shoben & Smith, 
1973; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Rosch & Mervis, 1975).  
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 A central assumption of this tradition is that response times and accuracy patterns can be 
used to determine the organization within and between the categories of object knowledge. 
Findings of this type led to the view that semantic categories rely on graded relationships based 
on the overall similarity of features, or lack thereof, among category members. In this regard, 
this prototype theory of concepts is seen as a rejection of the classical view that categories 
consist of necessary and sufficient conditions for determining membership. Instead, prototypes 
are said to reflect the graded similarity relations among category members in which no one 
feature is crucial for membership, a so-called family resemblance view (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). 
Prototypes are viewed as a stored representation of the properties that generally tend to represent 
members of that category. For instance, within the category ‘bird’, ‘robin’ and ‘cardinal’ are 
considered prototypical members, whereas ‘penguin’ is not based on the typically shared features 
of ‘has wings’, ‘can fly’, and ‘lays eggs’. Properties1 that are generally weighted as more 
important for a given category are shared among the most category members. Under response 
time constraints the more typical members (e.g., ‘cardinal’ and ‘robin’) are readily confirmed, as 
they are said to share the most features with the ‘average’ member of the category (e.g., birds). 
In this regard, the similarity between the item and its closest stored prototype is computed based 
on the similarity of those features. Finally, it is decided whether the new item is ‘similar enough’ 
to be called a member of the given category.  
There is one clear problem with the prototype approach: How do we decide when an item is 
‘similar enough’ to be a member of a given category, and what happens when an item shares 
many properties with a category (e.g., Is a ‘bat’ a ‘bird’?) yet cannot be considered a member? 
That is, how are borderline instances decided? For example, a simple decomposition of the 
                                                 
1 The terms ‘feature’, ‘property’, and ‘attribute’, are treated mostly interchangeable throughout to avoid any possible 
negative connotation with a particular term. It is not clear whether any meaningful differences can be maintained 
between these terms with regard to the present discussion. 
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 visual, but also behavioral and scientific, properties often associated with the average ‘bird’ 
generally predicts the response time findings. Borderline cases (i.e. ‘penguin’ and ‘bat’) take 
subjects longer to resolve the category membership, in contrast to the more rapid confirmations 
of the prototypical, or central, members (e.g., ‘robin’) of the category. Yet, penguins do not look 
like the average ‘bird’ (i.e., they are large, stand upright, and lack feathers) nor do they ‘fly’. 
And while penguins are adept in and under water, they are still scientifically classified as birds, 
largely because of their egg-based reproductive cycle that occurs outside of the organism. In 
contrast, while a bat seems more visually and behaviorally similar to the average ‘bird’, it is 
correctly classified as a mammal, also largely because of how it reproduces (i.e., gives birth to 
live young). Prototype models of categorization have trouble with these types of borderline cases 
because the relevant features must be stored and processed independently of the average 
category member. The borderline cases would seem to represent exceptions that require defining 
features to fix category membership, and a prototype representation is insufficient in this regard.  
Two-stage models were developed to address this specific difficulty with prototype theories 
of categorization. Rips, Shoben, & Smith (1973) asked subjects to confirm sentences such as: “A 
robin is a bird” or “A robin is an animal”, a so called category verification task. They found that 
subjects were generally faster to confirm the immediate superordinate than the higher 
superordinate relations, though some interesting exceptions were also apparent. Smith, Shoben, 
& Rips (1974) posited a two-stage comparison process to account for these differences in 
verification time. They proposed that the first-stage relies on the overall similarity of features, 
borrowing from the prototype view, but the second stage would compare only the defining, or 
relational, features. Interestingly, the second stage could be abbreviated or omitted if there was a 
very high or low degree of feature similarity. Thus, rapid confirmations (or disconfirmations) 
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 could be made on the basis of similarity alone, as in prototype models. The defining features 
would only be necessary in intermediate, or borderline, cases. In this regard, category 
membership is fixed through two distinct phases, the first driven by featural similarity, usually 
based on visual properties (e.g., ‘cardinal’ and ‘hawk’ to the ‘bird’ category), while the second 
stage relies on defining, or rule-like, features to firmly draw the boundary (e.g., affirming 
‘penguin’ while rejecting ‘bat’) around a given category. Many subsequent models have also 
assumed that two components of processing are required for category verifications though the 
exact formulations may vary as well the implications of prototypes on theories of concepts (see 
for example McClosky & Gluckberg, 1979 and Armstrong, Gleitman, & Gleitman, 1983). 
A large body of recent literature discusses the distinction between similarity- and rule-based 
mechanisms but a hybrid model of their interplay is not often the focus of empirical work (Hahn, 
1998). Similarity-based processes are seen to account for the reaction times of adults in 
categorization decisions (Goldstone, 1994; Hampton, 1997). On this view, similarity is based on 
perceptual mechanisms that compare the particular instance to a summation of a category’s 
members, perhaps a prototype. However, this view has been criticized on the grounds that 
children could not acquire a theoretical concept from similarity relations alone (Murphy & 
Medin, 1985; Keil, 1989), nor is similarity sufficient when category members are exceptions to 
the general featural tendencies within a given category. Defining features, or even explicit rules, 
whether based on scientific knowledge or more general relational information, are necessary to 
account for the wide range of categories apparent within the semantic system. Feature similarity 
may act as a constraining mechanism in terms of how members of a given category are 
structured together. That is, the more properties items share in common, the more similar they 
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 are, and the greater the likelihood that they belong to the same category and thus have other 
features in common.  
Feature similarity may also be a basic principle of how the brain represents semantic 
knowledge across sensory modalities. Perceptual properties of object knowledge appear to be 
represented by the same sensory brain regions associated with the encoding that information. 
Two items may be considered as sharing similar features if both rely on a common set of sensory 
brain regions. In this way, category representations may largely arise from perceptual 
mechanisms responsible representing the information such that perceptually similar categories 
rely on the same neural substrate. Yet, some categories seem to be well constrained by abstract 
or defining features (e.g., living things ? does it eat and reproduce?) whereas other categories 
(e.g., furniture) seem to be more a product of the superficial similarity of the constituent, and 
perceptual, features. In this way, the reduction of category members to particular feature types is 
a central theme in contemporary theories of semantic memory especially in relating different 
property types to distinct brain regions.  
 
1.2. Contemporary behavioral models of semantic knowledge representation 
 
More recent theories in the representation of semantic knowledge address how conception 
and perception may be reunited (Goldstone & Barsalou, 1998). In particular, a perceptually-
based proposal for symbol grounding by Barsalou (1999) attempts to model the conceptual 
system as a product of how the brain encodes and represents sensory information (see also 
Allport, 1985). By considering sensory experience as a recording system, this perceptual symbol 
theory accounts for the direct relationship between perceptual features and conceptual 
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 knowledge by reducing the former to bottom-up processing in posterior sensory-motor areas of 
the brain. In later experience, these features are reinitialized by top-down modulatory 
mechanisms. According to Barasalou (1999), the storage and retrieval of perceptual symbols 
operates at the level of sensory components that are directly recorded from experience and stored 
for future use (e.g., ‘purr’, ‘green’, and ‘hot’). As symbols become organized, with additional 
weightings from attentional mechanisms, they enable simulations of these components 
independent of the perceptual experiences that gave rise to them and eventually reference a 
particular modal representation (i.e., a word or picture). Over time, these representations take on 
increasing specificity and complexity with symbolic referents gradually standing in for the actual 
objects so that detailed decisions can be made from memory (e.g., does a bird have: four legs? an 
antenna?). Category relations emerge under this view by the type of interrelations that occur 
among the perceptual components, or properties.   
The most relevant aspect of this proposal for the current focus is the productivity of symbol 
representation that it predicts. Since perceptual features of object knowledge are stored in 
analogous regions of cortex to where those properties were encoded by sensory mechanisms, 
there would seem to be a limitless base from which all knowledge representation could emerge, 
without the need for a separate encoding and storage mechanism. In general support of this 
linking between perception and conception, Glenberg and Robertson (2000) have suggested that 
words are indexed by affordances to perceptual objects and experiences. In addition, Zwaan and 
colleagues (Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002) have found that when subjects are read sentences 
regarding the location of an animal or an object, the shape of the object changes as a function of 
its location (e.g., an eagle in the sky or in the nest). Therefore the current behavioral evidence 
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 suggests that conceptual knowledge is grounded by perceptual properties, perhaps based on the 
roles of sensory brain regions in representing this semantic information.  
In both the neuropsychological and neuroimaging literatures examining semantic knowledge 
there has been a consistent blurring between perceptual mechanisms and conceptual knowledge. 
The ways that properties of objects are instantiated within the cortex demonstrate how category 
knowledge can arise from overlapping patterns of activity in adjacent brain regions. That is, the 
similarity between members of the same superordinate category (e.g., animals) is likely based on 
common set of cortical regions being active, as predicted by Allport (1985). In contrast, the more 
difficult semantic decisions involve distinguishing between highly similar instances (e.g., tiger 
and leopard) and uniting subcategories that share very little perceptually in common (e.g., living 
thing = plants and animals). This breadth and depth of semantic knowledge is likely based upon 
different types of properties being localized to different regions of cortex. Neuropsychological 
patients with specific deficits of semantic knowledge provide preliminary evidence for how these 
types of properties may be organized to particular brain regions. 
 
1.3. The selective impairment of semantic categories through specific properties  
When damage is localized to fairly discrete regions of cortex and the loss or preservation of 
semantic knowledge is observed, there is a strong tendency to associate the impacted area with a 
role in conceptual representation. Typically such patients demonstrate an inability to name or 
retrieve information about objects (e.g., tiger) and often via multiple modalities. These patterns 
of loss or preserved knowledge seem to reflect, on some level, category boundaries, specifically 
that the representation of an item requires posterior sensory regions of cortex. When these areas 
are damaged, patients show selective deficits to categories (e.g., animal) that tend to rely upon 
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 the particular feature type (e.g., color) represented by that area. However, even when the 
perceptually-based representation of an item is impaired (e.g., naming it from a description: 
“What is that smart swimming mammal with fins?”), the patient may still be possible to access 
abstract information about (e.g., the ‘animal’ was used to find underwater mines during World 
War II) the item. This distinction is likely due to a dissociable neuroanatomical basis for each 
type of knowledge. Therefore, case studies provide compelling evidence of the distinct types of 
properties represented and processed by sensory (i.e., perceptual properties) and prefrontal (i.e., 
relational and abstract properties) cortical regions.  
 If a patient with a circumscribed lesion demonstrates impaired performance on one class 
of categories (e.g., living things) but not another (e.g., non-living things), an existence proof is 
provided that on some level the underlying neuroanatomy reflects categories boundaries. 
However this evidence merely provides a starting point in that such cases are relatively rare and 
are seldom completely overlapping from one patient to the next. The direct evidence from such 
studies is that semantic knowledge can be explained in terms of the cortical areas necessary for 
encoding the perceptual properties most relevant for some categories but not others. In this 
regard, the neuroanatomy is likely to represent much more basic aspects of items in addition to 
explicit category labels. What exactly is impaired in patients with semantic deficits is the subject 
of much current debate. 
Neuropsychological findings of category distinctions within semantic memory support the 
relationship between sensory brain mechanisms and conceptual knowledge, as predicted in 
perceptual symbol systems (Barsalou, 1999). These case studies suggest a neuroantomical 
distinction between the role of temporal cortical areas in the representation, or content, of 
semantic knowledge and that of prefrontal areas in processing relational information and abstract 
10 
 rules. Two stage models of category verification seem to require this distinction in the 
underlying neuroanatomy, especially in order to explain the difference in response times for easy 
and hard verification judgments within a particular category. Patients with lesions can thus 
provide a preliminary foundation for understanding the relationship between behavioral models 
of category structure and processing and the underlying neuroanatomy that gives rise to them.  
The neuropsychological literature is filled with case studies that demonstrate a selective loss 
of semantic memory (for recent reviews, see Saffran & Schwartz, 1994; and Caramazza, 1998) 
even though such cases are relatively rare (Coltheart, 2001). A distinction between living and 
non-living things, even if this formulation is inexact, has been the most frequently reported 
among patients with semantic memory impairments (Mummery, Patterson, Hodges, & Price, 
1998). Damage localized to inferomedial temporal cortex, usually resulting from encephalitis of 
the herpes simplex virus, has been associated with impaired performance for living things (e.g., 
animals, fruits, and vegetables) relative to a sparing of artifact (e.g., tools, household objects, 
vehicles) knowledge (Gainotti & Silveri, 1996; Hart & Gordon, 1992). The reverse pattern of 
category-specific deficits, i.e., non-living things impaired relative to a preservation of living 
thing knowledge, usually from damage to frontoparietal areas, has also been found (Warrington 
& McCarthy, 1987; Hills & Caramazza, 1991; Sacchett & Humphreys, 1992). This double 
dissociation has led to the inference that semantic knowledge is organized on some level by 
category-specific information.  
In the face of category-specific deficits, and more diffuse semantic disturbances when 
stimulus factors are rigorously controlled, a number of proposals have been advanced to explain 
the living thing/nonliving dissociation found among patients. The most widely accepted view 
assumes that there are substantial differences in the saliency of semantic features for particular 
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 categories (Mummery et al., 1998) and that the neural instantiation of these features is biased to 
higher-order cortical areas mostly responsible for encoding them (e.g., visual features in 
extrastriate regions). The assumption is that living things are distinguished from each other 
primarily through their visual or perceptual properties (e.g., consider the difference between a 
tiger and a lion) while artifacts are determined more by functional features (e.g., consider when a 
jar can be considered a vase). The assumption is that damage to the semantic network 
differentially affects the neural regions associated with processing visual or functional semantic 
features and thus the categories that rely on these features (Warrington & Shallice, 1984; Saffran 
& Schwartz, 1994). This proposal has been termed the perceptual/ functional hypothesis. 
Warrington & Shallice (1984) describe four cases, all as a result of herpes simplex 
encephalic damage to both temporal lobes, in which the patients exhibit much poorer 
performance in comprehending or producing the names for living things but intact knowledge for 
non-living things. For example, patient JBR identified the pictures of just 3 of 48 living things 
yet he was correct on 43 out of 48 inanimate objects. And whereas he defined ‘briefcase’ as a 
“small case used by students to carry papers”, ‘snail’ was described as “an insect animal”. This 
category-specific deficit for living things and food items was found to differing degrees in the 
four patients across a wide range tasks, including verbal descriptions, naming, mimed responses, 
and picture/word matching. In contrast, Warrington and McCarthy (1983) demonstrate that 
patient VER shows a relative preservation in the comprehension of animals, plants, and food 
items (e.g. ‘soup’) but a gross impairment for assorted household objects. Based on these 
observations, Warrington and McCarthy (1983) propose that the patterns of category-selective 
sparing and impairment reflects the distinction between perceptual (read: visual) properties more 
12 
 necessary to distinguish cabbage from lettuce and the functional (read: usage) qualities required 
to differentiate a table from a desk.  
Warrington & Shallice (1984) argue that the selective impairment and preservation of 
semantic categories reflects a distinction between artifacts, that require functional qualities to 
differentiate similar members while visual properties remain fairly constant, and living things, 
perhaps natural kinds, which be distinguished by subtle perceptual elements. While many of 
JBR’s difficulties coincided with living items (e.g., flowers and animals), a few impaired 
categories are clearly non-living even as he was very good with most objects and even body 
parts. Along these lines, JBR was impaired on musical instruments and precious stones, 
categories in which items would seem to be differentiated by visual features (consider: ‘trumpet’ 
and ‘trombone’ and ‘diamond’ and ‘ruby’) like shape, sounds, and colors. These more 
anomalous aspects of JBR’s performance can be addressed from the perspective of patient YOT 
(Warrington & McCarthy, 1987) who is shown to exhibit fine-grained categorical deficits and 
selective sparing in the face of widespread impairments in the capacities for the comprehension 
and production of prepositional speech. The semantic profile of YOT is almost the mirror reverse 
of JBR in that her impairments are mostly with small manipulable objects and furniture, but 
interestingly also body parts, while she demonstrates a selective sparing of animals, flowers, 
foods, vegetables, along with different types of fabric. Her case provides further evidence for a 
double dissociation between the knowledge for items differentiated primarily through perceptual 
features and those distinguished according to their functional attributes.  
A number of other studies (e.g., Warrington & McCarthy, 1983; Sacchett & Humphreys, 
1992; Moss & Tyler, 2000) have also shown that categories grounded by functional properties 
can be damaged almost independently of perceptually-based categories. Sacchett and Humphreys 
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 (1992) present patient CW who is selectively impaired at naming and recognizing common 
artifacts and body parts, even as his performance with animals, fruits, and vegetables, was mostly 
normal. Knowledge of object use has been shown to be selectively impaired in patients with 
semantic dementia (Hodges, Bozeat, Lambon Ralph, Patterson, & Spatt, 2000). Furthermore, 
Buxbaum & Saffran (2002) have found that manipulability, or the knowledge for the type of 
action used with a given artifact (e.g., hammer - nail), is selectively impaired in apraxics with 
fronto-parietal lesions. In the behavioral literature, it has been recently proposed that recognizing 
artifacts require some understanding of a designer’s intentions (Bloom, 1996; for discussion see 
Malt & Johnson, 1998; and Bloom, 1998) or how it should be used. It seems then that the brain 
honors the extent to which an artifact is reducible to its functional attributes, or its intended 
abstract use, rather than its shape or color which can vary widely. For example, consider the 
many variants of a radio from a pocket version to car and home stereos. 
Recent computational models implement the perceptual/functional hypothesis that particular 
conceptual domains differ in the degree and pattern of property correlations (Farah & 
McClelland, 1991; McRae, de Sa, & Seidenberg, 1997; Devlin, Gonnerman, Andersen, & 
Seidenberg, 1998; McClelland & Rogers, 2003). For example, using feature ratings from 
subjects, Farah & McClelland (1991) modeled the general living/non-living distinction as a 
function of the properties ascribed to each category. When the nodes representing visual-
semantic elements were damaged, the model was impaired in producing the names for living 
things, with impairment increasing with the amount of damage. In contrast, when the functional-
semantic units were damaged, the model was unable to correctly name the non-living things. In 
this regard, the category distinctions are seen to arise from the differential weighting of the 
constituent properties. More recently, Rogers and McClelland (2004) update and extend this 
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 work to show how the mechanisms of the same computational model based on the features of 
items can account not only for these deficits but also for behavioral response patterns of normal 
children and adults. 
A number of investigators propose alternative hypotheses for these category-specific effects. 
Rather than as a result of differing degrees of damage to specifically functional or perceptual 
properties per se, both Humphreys & Forde (2001; Forde, Francis, Riddoch, Rumiati, & 
Humphreys, 1997) and Moss & Tyler (Moss, Tyler, Durrant Peatfield, & Bunn, 1998; Moss, 
Tyler, & Jennings, 1997) have both proposed some version of a ‘density’ hypothesis for the 
structure of semantic categories and their selective breakdown. According to this view, members 
of a category may share from just a few (e.g., consider: office products) to very many (e.g., 
consider: four-legged animals) overlapping attributes. These density theories predict that the 
more properties shared within a given category, the harder it will be to distinguish any one 
exemplar with damage to that feature set.  
For instance, Moss & Tyler (1997) point out that the biological functions that apply to most 
living things are strongly correlated with common, and largely interacting, perceptual elements 
like outline shape (Lloyd-Jones & Luckhurst, 2002). Yet the distinctive perceptual features that 
distinguish one animal from another (e.g., stripes or spots) have no meaningful connection with 
these functional markers. Keil (1989) has shown that young children have extensive difficulty 
recognizing that surface features for living things play no role other than aiding in identification, 
such that if they are shown that the stripes are removed from a tiger, the child will claim it has 
become a lion. Similarly, Carey (1985) has demonstrated that children must learn to ignore the 
differences in the outward behavior between plants and animals, to understand the intrinsic 
biological mechanisms that unite them under the common category. After localized damage, the 
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 common perceptual features of living things that support these abstract biological properties 
remain preserved (Forde et al., 1997) in the face of losses to individual perceptual elements 
necessary for the identification of individual items (e.g., tiger from leopard). Accordingly, Moss 
et al. (1998) report that patient RC is nevertheless able to sort living things based on their shared 
properties even though he demonstrates tremendous difficulty naming the same items.  
Artifacts, on the other hand, seem to depend crucially on such subtle, and often times unique, 
form-function contingencies. That is, the teeth of a saw are just as important for how it looks as 
for what it does, as are the tines of a fork. In recognizing artifacts, these tighter form-function 
contingencies of distinctive visual properties to functional attributes leads to better preservation 
of this knowledge when damage to one type of feature occurs. So even when temporal regions 
that support shape and color are damaged, the name of the artifact can still be derived from intact 
functional and relational features.  
 The cortical segregation of living and non-living things is generally inferred from category-
specific effects for animals and fruits on the one hand, and a diverse set of artifacts on the other. 
However, these abstract, and theory-based (see for instance Carey, 1985), categories are 
multifaceted, and even vague, and as such, there is very little evidence that either category can be 
selectively spared or impaired as a whole (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998). More often the observed 
deficit or sparing is much more selective. In many cases patients demonstrate almost complete 
recovery from cerebral damage except for a specific category deficit, such as just for animals 
(Hart & Gordon, 1992; Caramazza & Shelton, 1998), fruits and vegetables (Hart, Berndt, & 
Caramazza, 1985), or plants (Pietrini et al., 1988). Similarly a selective sparing, in the face of 
widespread deficits, has been shown for body parts (Shelton et al., 1998). For instance, Hart, 
Berndt, & Caramazza (1985) report on patient MD who demonstrates a selective impairment for 
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 naming fruits and vegetables and yet showed normal performance for animals, trees, assorted 
household objects, body parts, and clothing stimuli. In addition, MD demonstrates no impairment 
to other food items in contrast to the general impairment of this broader category found by 
Warrington and Shallice (1984). The results of this case study are further supported by Hillis & 
Caramazza (1991) who found a double dissociation between two patients, JJ and PS, where one 
was more impaired in naming animal items and relatively preserved on other objects, while the 
reverse was true for the other patient, even a year after their respective cortical insults. 
Furthermore, Shelton, Fouch, and Caramazza (1998) report that their patient IOC produces 
relatively spared responses to body parts in contrast to a diffuse impairment in naming and 
comprehending a wide range of semantic categories, including anomia for animals, fruits and 
vegetables, clothing, and household objects. These results point to the more exact specificity 
with which semantic knowledge may be deficient or preserved.  
Based on this much finer grain of selective impairments and preserved categories for living 
and non-living things, Caramazza and Shelton (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Caramazza, 1998; 
Shelton et al., 1998; Shelton & Caramazza, 2001) have proposed that the organization of 
semantic memory is broadly based on domain-specific, likely innately specified, mechanisms. In 
support of this domain-based view, they argue that if a category is selectively impaired or spared, 
a reductionistic feature-based account (i.e., the perceptual/functional or density theories) requires 
that other categories relying on similar properties, should show complementary performance. 
However, cases of very specific category effects, as cited above, seem to suggest an alternative 
explanation. Since the patterns of finer selectivity often favors categories (e.g., animals, plants, 
fruits and vegetables, and food items) that are inherently important for the survival of an 
individual, they suggest that evolutionary pressures influenced specific adaptations necessary for 
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 recognizing these items. In this regard, category-specific effects would be expected to reflect an 
underlying organization based on domains of knowledge, rather than on constituent feature sets. 
For example, it is crucial under survival conditions to recognize animals as either a food source 
or as a predator, and plant life as a source of medicine or nutrition. According to Caramazza and 
Shelton (1998), these evolutionary adaptations provide skeletal neural structures, in the form of 
dedicated circuitry or processing units, around the most salient distinctions in the conceptual 
world are organized.  Under this view, the differences between categories emerge from the 
distinction between animate and inanimate objects that eventually leads to neuroanatomical 
differences between the domains of living and nonliving things. In support of this theory, this 
distinction appears to have its basis in early infancy (for example see Bertenthal, 1993) and so 
conceptual organization would seem to be grounded innately if it arises directly from it.  
This evolutionary-based account has difficulty with the category-specific evidence in a 
number of ways. First, even if categories are organized at the neural level by domain-based 
distinctions, the internal structure of a given domain and how it is shaped by experience is still 
underspecified, as Caramazza (1998) readily admits. This point is made much clearer when we 
consider the finer-grained cases that this account seeks to explain. Why ‘body parts’ should be 
preserved (Shelton et al., 1998) independently of ‘animals’ and ‘fruits and vegetables’, and 
‘tools’ and ‘kitchen utensils’ for that matter, remains just as underspecified as it was in the 
perceptual/functional account. Second, more recent studies have been designed to specifically 
test the domain-specific theory. Borgo & Shallice (2001) report their patient MU to be much 
more impaired than four other patient controls in visually recognizing not only living things, but 
also materials (e.g., wood and glass), liquids (e.g., olive oil and alcohol), and substances (e.g., 
Nutella and ground pepper). The domain-specific theory does not account for these findings as 
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 there are no a priori reasons for assuming man-made liquids, materials and substances should be 
included with the domain of biological kinds, and instead these results would seem to support 
some form of the perceptual/functional feature-based processing distinction. In order for MU to 
recognize the sensory-based distinction between, for instance, ‘glass’ and ‘wood’ he had to rely 
on perceptual attributes that were likely lost as a result of damage to his temporal lobes. In 
addition, Marques (2002) has shown that in normal subjects, perceptual and functional feature 
processing is apparent, even when comparisons are made within a domain.   
While the developmental evidence does seem to support an early distinction in children 
between animate and inanimate things, this distinction is more likely based on highly salient 
movement characteristics rather than on a rudimentary domain-based biological understanding. 
Instead young children encounter great difficulty when they learn that movement is a mere 
consequence of life not a causal determinant (Carey, 1985; Keil, 1989). Even adults appear to 
represent ‘plants’ and ‘animals’ separately, and not under a common domain, based on reaction 
time evidence in a simple living/non-living category verification task (Goldberg, under review). 
Thus, there would seem to be little converging support for the domain-specific theory as it is 
currently formulated. 
  In general, alternative accounts to the perceptual/functional theory do not capture the 
category-specific effects as well, nor do they provide a basis of further extension. The 
perceptual/functional hypothesis remains the most viable, in terms of offering a principled 
account of why particular categories should be impaired together and why damage to particular 
regions of cortex are associated with certain deficits. That is, when the temporal lobes are 
damaged, patients have difficulty with categories that require perceptual, mostly visual, features 
to distinguish among similar instances (e.g., ‘tiger’ from ‘leopard’). In contrast, if a patient 
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 suffers from a lesion to the frontal or parietal lobes, any semantic memory deficit they encounter 
is more likely to affect categories that rely on functional properties or relational information. The 
perceptual/functional hypothesis can therefore explain why damage to certain regions of cortex 
should result in a particular impairment or preservation of semantic knowledge. This theory also 
offers a preliminary account for how semantic information may be instantiated by the sensory 
areas responsible for initially encoding that information, as predicted by the perceptual symbol 
theory, and further blurring the distinction between perception and conception. 
Extensions to perceptual/ functional proposal are represented by slightly different variants of 
density theories with a particular emphasis on whether properties a part of the sensory 
knowledge of a given item or rely on indirectly learned knowledge about the item. In this regard 
the neuropsychological literature appears to implicitly draw on a distinction proposed 
independently by Rips (1995) between representations of an object, based on direct sensory 
experiences, and information about the object, based on indirectly learned facts. According to 
density theories, the representation of a category is damaged or spared based on the form-
function feature contingencies that differentiate particular classes of objects (Humphreys & 
Forde, 2001). Similar members of a given category (e.g., animals) interfere with each other when 
distinguishing, but superficial, features (e.g., ‘spots’ and ‘stripes’) are disrupted, yet leave intact 
abstract, and more relational, biological features (Moss et al., 1997) that can still be associated 
with a mostly preserved category prototype for the gross set of common attributes (e.g., ‘four 
legs’). That is, the information about a category can remain mostly preserved so long as a basic 
prototype representation of the category remains. This split between the representation of a 
category and the information about that category can be explained in terms of the underlying 
neuroanatomy. For instance, a patient who shows an impaired ability to recognize the perceptual 
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 features of items yet who can verbally cite functional and encyclopedic properties of the same 
items argues for these two types of semantic knowledge subsiding in distinct anatomical regions. 
In this way, semantic knowledge would seem to be represented not just in terms of the 
accumulation of sensory and functional features averaged over exemplars, but also through the 
many relations between and within categories that are coded and simulated through language.   
The distinction between the representation of and the information about a given object appears to 
rely on differing functional anatomical substrates, such that one may be damaged independently 
of the other for a specific object category.  
McCarthy & Warrington (1988) report that their patient TOB performed normally when 
asked to name and describe pictures of living and nonliving things. Yet he was clearly impaired 
when asked to describe the same living things if the items were presented verbally. For instance 
to the word ‘dolphin’ he responded, “A fish or a bird.” But when he was presented with a picture 
of a ‘dolphin’ he responded, “Dolphin lives in water…they are trained to jump up and come 
out…In America during the war years they started to get this particular animal to go through to 
look into ships”. Clearly, the label served no real meaning, while performance was spared for 
artifacts (e.g., lighthouse ? “Round the coast, built up, tall building, lights revolve to warn 
ships). In contrast to this deficit for the verbal recognition of living things, Warrington and 
McCarthy (1994) describe how patient DRS exhibited a selective deficit for naming pictures of 
artifacts, even though he could identify them from verbal descriptions and while no deficit was 
found for either vehicles or animals. Not only are living things and artifacts dissociable 
according the perceptual features that are involved, but they are also differentiated in terms of the 
knowledge used to access verbal information about the items. De Renzi and Lucchelli (1994) 
found their patient Felicia to be impaired on perceptual properties for living items (i.e., animals, 
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 fruits, vegetables, flowers, and also foods), but she showed a spared ability to access functional-
encyclopedic knowledge of the same items (e.g., for vegetables ? used in minestrone?). This 
selective sparing of abstract relational information is significant because her lesions were most 
restricted to temporal regions leaving intact the candidate frontal regions necessary for 
supporting the controlled retrieval of abstract knowledge about the category. 
While these diverse results would seem to emphasize the interaction of input modalities, (i.e., 
sensory vs. verbal) with particular categories, this conclusion is still being debated. Lambon 
Ralph and colleagues (Lambon Ralph, Graham, Patterson, & Hodges, 1999) studied nine 
semantic dementia patients when they defined items from either the presentation of a picture or 
its spoken name. They note that while some patients show superiority for picture-based 
definitions, this advantage is likely due to the additional amount of information available in the 
stimuli. Since Lambon Ralph et al. (1999) found no differences between living things and 
artifacts, they argue that living things cannot be more reliant on perceptual features. And while 
this finding may seem to refute the perceptual/functional dichotomy discussed earlier, the 
definition tasks they used require more information about the categories, more so than physical 
attributes. Therefore it is not surprising that eight out of the nine patients produced more 
relational (e.g., ostriches live in Africa) than physical (e.g., an ostrich has a long neck) 
properties. Considering all of the patients suffered from lesions to the inferior aspect of either 
one or both temporal lobes, the impairment of this physical knowledge was expected. In this 
regard, while these patients showed no category-specific effects, the abstract encyclopedic 
knowledge that they rely on to provide verbal definitions draws upon information about these 
categories presumably based on spared cortical regions in the frontal cortex. This evidence 
provides further support for the view that semantic knowledge may be dissociated according to 
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 abstract relational elements, or information about items, and constituent sensory attributes, or 
representations of objects. 
The neuropsychological evidence provides two preliminary conclusions regarding what 
aspects of semantic knowledge are localizable to particular regions of cortex. First, to the extent 
that categories rely on perceptual or functional properties they may be selectively impaired or 
spared depending on the location of the damage. Patients with damage to the temporal lobes, 
usually recovering from encephalitis of the herpes simplex virus, tend to suffer from deficits to 
their knowledge of natural kinds and associated perceptual, especially visual, properties. As 
shown later in neuroimaging studies, this region of cortex has also been implicated in object 
color knowledge as well as more general object recognition processes. In contrast, frontoparietal 
lesions are more often associated with impaired performance on artifacts and their associated 
functional properties including how an object is used and what it does.  
Of the available theories, the perceptual/ functional hypothesis best describes this distinction 
and, more generally, how semantic features are localized to regions of cortex necessary for 
encoding the relevant sensory information, as predicted by perceptual symbol systems. The 
ventral temporal lobes support the subtle visual features necessary to distinguish among very 
similar items (e.g., leopard and tiger) most often associated with living things. Artifacts, on the 
other hand, rely on tighter form-function contingencies (e.g., tines and fork) such that they 
remain relatively spared with deficits to visual knowledge with the functional attributes aiding in 
identification. Such intercorrelation of feature types is suggested by density theories that 
supplement the perceptual/functional hypothesis. The anatomical localization of these two 
feature types argues for a distribution and representation of semantic knowledge based on the 
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 constituent properties of a given category and the sensory-motor areas of cortex necessary for 
initially encoding that information. 
The second preliminary conclusion from the neuropsychological literature is that not only 
can perceptual properties be selectively damaged or spared, but so too can more abstract 
relational features. Visual discrimination is required for the fine distinctions between animal 
exemplars. These form-based differences appear to rely on visual object processing regions in 
ventrolateral temporal cortices. In contrast, more abstract relational information, coded by verbal 
cues, seems to be processed, and perhaps represented, by frontal cortical regions. In this regard, 
the temporal lobes appear to be more directly involved in the representation of a category, that is 
those features that can be directly encoded by perceptual mechanisms, whereas the frontal lobes 
appear to support semantic processing regarding the features involved in representing 
information about a given category, or those features necessarily coded by the language system. 
This dissociation is exemplified by findings that even when patients cannot identify a given item, 
for example a dolphin, they can still access abstract knowledge regarding aspects such as habitat 
and behavior. These prefrontal regions involved in such abstract semantic knowledge may rely 
on specific processing mechanisms or more rule-based representations. 
Both of these preliminary findings have been more recently examined in the context of 
neuroimaging findings of the organization and processing of semantic memory. By comparing 
the semantic deficits found in neuropsychological patients with neuroimaging activations for 
mostly the same categories in normal individuals, object concepts are shown to be instantiated in 
the predicted cortical regions, including the wide distribution of categories depending upon their 
predominant property type. In this regard, neuroimaging methods more directly localize visual 
properties to broad networks within inferior temporal regions used in visual object recognition. 
24 
 In contrast, the prefrontal cortex appears to subserve at least two distinct semantic functions, one 
involving general semantic processing demands and the other involved in representing abstract 
and relational semantic information. 
 
1.4. The neuroimaging of semantic knowledge: Localizing content not categories 
Neuroimaging methods, such as Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), provide fine-grained spatial (i.e., at the millimeter level) 
and temporal (i.e., on the order of seconds) resolution in vivo of cognitive operations in the 
normal brain. These methods enable a direct mapping of the myriad of ways that the brain uses 
internal codes to process and represent information. Using these methods it is possible to 
compare the locations of such cognitive operations with evidence from patterns of association 
and dissociation in the neuropsychological literature (Posner, Petersen, Fox, & Raichle, 1988). 
With recent advances in understanding the relationship between the hemodynamic signal of local 
oxygen dependencies and the underlying neural population (Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, Trinath, 
& Oeltermann, 2001), and aided by cognitive theories, it is now possible to instantiate the 
complexities of semantic knowledge in terms of how the cortex represents and processes our 
understanding of the world. 
Some of the earliest work in neuroimaging (Petersen, Fox, Posner, Mintun, & Raichle, 1988; 
Petersen, Fox, Posner, Mintun, & Raichle, 1989) was directed at uncovering how lexical items 
and the generation of semantic associates rely on different brain regions. Participants were 
presented with single words representing concrete nouns (e.g., ‘hammer’) and were asked to 
generate an appropriate verb (e.g., ‘pound’) for each item. Petersen et al. (1989) found that in 
comparison to when subjects simply read the words, this verb generation task activated a 
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 disparate network of brain regions including the prefrontal cortex. This initial evidence has 
provided the thrust for current investigations of conceptual representations by using 
neuroimaging methods to more precisely determine the locations responsible for the structure 
and processing of semantic knowledge.  
In a recent review (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000) of 275 functional neuroimaging studies, 46 
studies were shown to address semantic memory retrieval. Most of these studies explore the 
knowledge of words and objects, and Cabeza and Nyberg differentiate these into two broad 
groups: those that use either categorization or generation tasks. The categorization tasks ask 
participants to classify words or pictures into different categories, (e.g., living or non-living?), 
similar to seminal category verification tasks. Generation tasks, like the verb generation task just 
discussed, assess the regions involved in word production to a given cue (e.g., stem completion 
? ti---?). Cabeza and Nyberg also differentiate a smaller set of studies that that use mostly 
object-naming and word-reading tasks to more directly explore the distinctions between domains 
(e.g., living and nonliving things) and categories (e.g., animals and tools). Across all of these 
tasks, semantic memory retrieval is generally associated with greater activation of prefrontal, 
parietal, and temporal cortices, exactly what we should expect from case studies of category-
specific effects. That is, the neuropsychological evidence has shown that damage to these regions 
produces selective deficits in the retrieval of some categories of items. In addition, these areas 
map onto traditional language areas (e.g., Broca’s area = left inferior frontal gyrus) as well as 
provide new insights into how semantic knowledge is both organized and processed (Demonet et 
al., 1992), based on both category-type and the requisite properties involved.  
For instance, when subjects are simply asked to monitor a stream of aurally presented animal 
names (e.g., ‘turtle’) for whether the animal was both ‘native to the United States’ and ‘used by 
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 humans’, a widespread, left lateralized network of regions, in contrast to a tone detection task, 
was uncovered that extends beyond traditional language areas and is consistent across subjects 
(Binder et al., 1997). The most activated regions included left hemisphere temporoparietal areas 
adjacent to, but spreading out from, Wernicke’s area, including middle and inferior temporal, 
fusiform, and angular gyri, extensive left prefrontal regions near to Broca’s area, as well areas in 
which the exact semantic functions are unknown, such as the anterior and posterior cingulate 
gyri, left subcortical regions including thalamus, and the right cerebellum. Somewhat 
surprisingly, some of these same regions are activated by a standard rest control task that has 
often been used as a baseline contrast for the cognitive task of interest in neuroimaging studies 
(Binder et al., 1999) suggesting that the semantic retrieval network is a default obligatory 
process2, even during nonlinguistic tasks (Price, Wise, & Frackowiak, 1996).  
This broad network of regions must also interact substantially to produce the intuition of 
unified and yet flexible semantic representations such as category knowledge. For instance, 
activation patterns found within, for example, temporal cortex directly suggest how the contents 
of semantic memory may intertwine. Middle temporal gyrus (BA 21) is activated by words and 
object pictures (Martin, Wiggs, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 1996; Martin, Haxby, Lalonde, Wiggs, & 
Ungerleider, 1995; Vandenberghe, Price, Wise, Josephs, & Frackowiak, 1996) suggesting a role 
in the convergence of semantic information regardless of modality. Even blind and normal 
subjects are shown to activate the same temporal lobe location when word stimuli are either 
tactile or visual, relative to nonword letter strings (Buchel, Price, & Friston, 1998). In addition, 
the left anterior temporal pole has been cited as an important location for the composition of 
                                                 
2 This evidence argues against the use of a simple rest control task in neuroimaging studies, especially as a contrast 
for linguistic tasks. It seems that subjects tend to engage everyday brain regions when asked to simply ‘rest’, thus in 
a direct contrast with the control task, the task of interest may fail to show many relevant regions necessary for 
performing the cognitive task. 
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 sentence meaning from the interaction of grammar and semantics (Vandenberghe, Nobre, & 
Price, 2002). Thus a widespread network of cortical regions would appear to be involved in the 
representation and processing of semantic knowledge.  
Based on the neuropsychological evidence, recent neuroimaging investigations of semantic 
memory have focused on the distinct regions of activity found for different categories and their 
constituent properties. The general impairment of living things with damage to ventral and 
inferior temporal regions has been recently clarified with neuroimaging studies that show how 
visual information may be specifically coded by specialized sub-regions and by more diffuse 
patterns of cortical activity. In addition, research on the anatomical regions responsible for 
semantic processing, such as controlled retrieval and selection from competing sources, has 
highlighted the role of, specifically, the left prefrontal cortex in the representation of abstract, 
verbally-mediated information.  
 
1.5. Localizing semantic properties to sensory-motor brain regions 
The distinction between semantic structures and semantic processing is based on seminal 
behavioral findings, and this distinction, perhaps because it is so helpful in conceptualizing 
categories, has been adopted, with a strong push from the neuropsychological findings, by 
neuroimaging investigations into semantic memory. Notions of semantic structure, in particular, 
are most amenable to a reductionist perspective on the role of specific types of properties in 
category membership, and the locations where they can be localized in cortex, mostly the 
sensory-motor regions necessary for encoding the perception of that information.  
The neuropsychological evidence suggests that the differential weighting of property types, 
(e.g., for animals, subtle visual properties) and their intercorrelations, locates category 
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 knowledge into distinct cortical regions (e.g., ventral temporal areas). As the most common 
dissociation in the neuropsychological literature is between living and nonliving things, this 
distinction has also been more recently investigated using neuroimaging. In a blocked design 
participants were asked in separate experiments to sort items, both pictures (Sergent, Ohta, 
MacDonald, & Pulvermueller, 1992) and words (Price, Moore, Humphreys, & Wise, 1997), into 
living and nonliving classes. The activity for this gross semantic task was compared to a more 
general linguistic control, in these studies a letter-sound coherency judgment and syllable 
counting task, respectively. The results implicated left ventral temporal cortex in this general 
semantic processing suggesting that participants use visual properties to simply classify items as 
living or non-living things. However, this result says little about how the different content 
between the two categories is necessarily represented and accessed. 
  In a direct comparison between natural kinds and artifacts, Mummery and colleagues 
(Mummery, Patterson, Hodges, & Wise, 1996) used PET to investigate item retrieval in response 
to natural kind category labels (e.g., ‘fruit’ and ‘land animals’), manipulable object category 
labels (e.g., ‘toys’ and ‘weapons’), and initial letters (e.g., ‘S’ and ‘P’). Participants were 
instructed to articulate as many appropriate exemplars as possible to the different cues during the 
20-second scans. They found that this semantic category retrieval task, in contrast to initial letter 
fluency, activated inferolateral and anteromedial aspects of the left temporal lobe. The direct 
contrast between semantic categories showed greater activation bilaterally in the anteromedial 
temporal lobe for the natural kind categories whereas the manipulable objects elicited posterior 
inferolateral temporal cortex, generally supporting the dissociation of these broad classes that has 
been found in the lesion literature. This restriction of activity to the temporal lobes appears to 
indicate that when participants generate category exemplars they rely on visual properties. 
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 These results have been questioned by Devlin and colleagues (Devlin et al., 2002b) in a study 
first performed using PET and then replicated with fMRI. They initially found differences 
between living things and artifacts in a lexical decision experiment but these effects disappeared 
once a more stringent significance level was adopted that corrected for multiple comparisons. 
They then tested whether this null result was due to the relative ease with which a lexical 
decision experiment is performed in contrast to a more demanding semantic task. Subjects were 
asked to read three cue words presented in a sequence and then were to judge whether a fourth 
word belonged to the same category, either natural kinds or artifacts. This task was then 
compared with a letter categorization control that asked subjects to view three consecutive trials 
of differing numbers of the same lowercase letter where the test trial was either the same or a 
different letter in uppercase font. In using both PET and fMRI, no effect of category was found 
at the corrected threshold though effects of tools and natural kinds were found at an uncorrected 
threshold which were somewhat consistent with the previous findings for these categories. The 
authors argue that while category information is widely distributed in the cortex, the semantic 
system is undifferentiated by category at the neural level. However, this conclusion may be 
premature especially considering recent work from some of the same contributors.  
 Devlin and a mostly separate set of colleagues (Devlin et al., 2002a) examined the 
inconsistencies of these reports by combining the data from seven prior neuroimaging studies 
used to investigate category differences into a single multifactorial analysis which crossed 
category (living vs. artifact) with a range of tasks. Their hypothesis centered on the view that 
category-specific effects in the neuroimaging literature may be relatively small and task 
dependent. In support of this prediction, they found reliable category effects in only word 
retrieval tasks and semantic decisions. In addition, they provided converging support for the 
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 findings of Mummery and colleagues (Mummery et al., 1996) as living things were found to 
activate bilateral anteromedial aspects of the temporal lobes while tools activated a left middle 
posterior region of temporal cortex. These findings support the view that the content of 
categories is anatomically dissociable but may be mediated by task conditions. This conclusion is 
further bolstered by studies that compare more discrete categories that generally share many 
properties (e.g., animals), the level at which category segregation is likely to occur, as predicted 
by the perceptual/functional hypothesis. Not surprisingly, the living/nonliving distinction while 
providing the initial thrust for neuroimaging studies of semantic memory is as underspecified, 
and perhaps as unhelpful, as it was in the neuropsychological studies. That is, an apple and a 
tiger would seem to have few features in common though both likely use visual properties for 
differentiation from near ‘family’ members within their respective superordinate categories. 
When using more constrained categories, and thus a greater likelihood for the same sets of 
properties, neuroimaging methods have been more successful at uncovering the separable 
anatomical bases for the content of semantic knowledge and the relationship to 
neuropsychological case studies (Damasio, Grabowski, Tranel, Hichwa, & Damasio, 1996; for 
discussion see Caramazza, 1996). Replicable activation differences between animals and artifacts 
have been found (Perani et al., 1995; Martin et al., 1996) with left occipitotemporal regions in 
the ventral visual stream more active for animals and left prefrontal and premotor regions more 
active for tools, supporting the specific locations predicted by the neuropsychological case 
studies. More recently, Chao and Martin (2000) found that simply viewing and naming pictures 
of tools activated left ventral premotor cortex (BA 6) suggesting a motor analogue for the 
semantic features of these objects. In addition, recent work (Le Clec'H et al., 2000) has shown 
that regions adjacent to these areas are active when subjects consider the location of named body 
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 parts, further implicating this general region in the representation of categories that require 
knowledge of movements associated with objects. In general, sensory brain motor areas that are 
necessary for encoding relevant perceptual information are also associated with the 
representation of the categories that rely on this information. 
More specifically, across a range of tasks, Chao, Haxby, & Martin (1999) show that viewing, 
matching, and naming animals significantly activates not only occipital visual regions but also 
elicits bilateral activation in the lateral aspect of the fusiform gyrus including the 
occipitotemporal sulcus. Importantly, these regions are a part of the upper levels in the visual 
object processing hierarchy (Haxby et al., 2001). Moore and Price (1999) extend the ventral 
temporal findings toward the left anterior pole when fruit pictures are named and matched with 
their verbal labels, similar to the region found by Mummery and colleagues (1996) bilaterally for 
the much broader natural kind category that included fruit items but with strictly verbal stimuli.  
In further support of the localization of semantic properties of objects, Martin, Chao, and 
colleagues (1995; Chao & Martin, 1999) have found that fusiform areas close to color perception 
were activated by the generation of color words. These areas are adjacent, and slightly anterior, 
to regions activated by animals across a wide-range of tasks, suggesting that the fine-grain of 
perceptual differentiation required to discriminate, for instance a tiger from a leopard, relies on 
the same cortical regions involved in perceiving this information. In contrast, the generation of 
action words activated a lateral occipitotemporal region close to motion perception areas. These 
areas border regions typically activated by tool stimuli suggesting a basis for the manipulation 
knowledge associated with some artifacts. Even categories that have generally been thought not 
to rely on visual information show increased activation in these regions when the visual details 
of these items are probed. Thompson-Shill et al. (1999) have shown that the left fusiform gyrus 
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 was more active when participants had to answer visual questions about artifacts (e.g., Are both 
the front and back end of a submarine approximately the same width?) than when they had to 
answer non-visual questions (Does a toaster use more electricity than a radio?). In contrast, no 
differences were found between visual and non-visual questions about living things suggesting 
that comparable visual semantic features are necessarily retrieved about living things regardless 
of the task context.  
Mummery and colleagues (Mummery et al., 1998) have directly investigated the role of both 
color and location attributes using similarity judgments across the categories of living and 
nonliving things. They expected to find ventral temporal regions more active for the color 
judgments and enhanced dorsal temporal-parietal activation for judging similarity of items based 
on their typical locations, in line with the now classic delineation of extrastriate processing 
streams (Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1992). Using a word triad task, subjects were asked to make a 
decision for which of two items was most similar to a target based on color (e.g., ‘flamingo’ ? 
‘salmon’ or ‘cherry’) or location (e.g., ‘paper’? ‘ruler’ or ‘rake’).  Mummery et al. (1998) found 
that, as predicted, the left anteromedial temporal cortex showed increased activation for color 
judgment replicating the role of this region in the representation of visual semantic attributes. In 
contrast, a dorsal region in the left temporo-occipito-parietal (TOP) junction was more active for 
judgments involving object locations implicating this area in the representation of semantic 
properties associated with where an object is typically found. Finally, artifacts showed an 
enhanced effect in the left posterior middle temporal gyrus, near to areas involved in object 
motion, replicating studies that associate this region with the representation of action knowledge. 
While the vast majority of neuroimaging studies into the content of semantic memory have 
relied almost exclusively on visual differences between categories, more recent work has looked 
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 at how other modalities may rely on sensory areas to process and represent semantic information. 
Noppeney and colleagues (2002), using an aural presentation of names for semantic features, 
found anterior and ventral regions of the left temporal lobe active in the processing of sensory-
based knowledge including both visual (e.g., ‘blue’) and auditory (e.g., ‘noise’) items. 
Furthermore when subjects are asked to judge the sound that an object makes, an area in 
posterior superior temporal cortex is activated that is, not surprisingly, adjacent to auditory 
association cortex (Kellenbach, Brett, & Patterson, 2001).  
To test how cortical regions may be specifically and selectively involved in the 
representation of semantic categories, we recently examined (Goldberg, Perfetti, & Schneider, 
2002) disparate brain regions as participants considered inter-item similarity relations. They were 
asked to covertly generate ”the most similar” item they could think of to a target item (e.g., 
‘duck’ ? [‘chicken’]), and then to choose from two items the one that was most similar to the 
item they had generated (e.g., ‘goose’ or ‘pigeon’). Unbeknownst to the subjects, all trials were 
drawn from four categories: fruits, birds, body parts, and clothing. These categories were chosen 
to reflect the neuropsychological dissociation between categories that tend to rely on visual (i.e., 
fruits and birds) or functional (i.e., clothing and body parts) properties. This semantic task, in 
contrast to a visuo-motor control condition, activated a left-lateralized network of brain regions 
including fusiform, inferior and ventral temporal, and anterior cingulate regions. The visual 
categories, as expected, activated ventral temporal cortex whereas the functional categories 
tended to drive lateral temporal regions, replicating previous results indicating exactly this 
dissociation between these types of categories. More interestingly, category-specific regions 
were found to be active depending upon the distribution of the presumed semantic properties to 
modalities representative of each set of items and their similarity relations. For example, fruit 
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 items selectively activated bilateral regions in orbitofrontal cortex. This region has been shown 
to represent taste and olfactory information (Rolls, 2001, 2002), exactly what we should expect 
given the similarity relations among fruit items, in contrast to the other categories tested. In 
contrast, body parts were shown to specifically activate a region in lateral occipitotemporal 
cortex near to where pictures of body parts are encoded (Beauchamp et al., 2002). These results 
generally support the prediction that semantic information is widely distributed to different 
cortical areas, specifically to sensory-motor regions associated with representing the constituent 
properties of the given categories. However, it is unclear whether the categories or their 
constituent properties gave rise to these effects. 
Semantic categories and their associated attributes would seem to be localized to discrete 
neuroanatomical regions depending on the conceptual content. In accord with the 
perceptual/functional hypothesis, visual categories and their associated properties seem to be 
represented by inferior and ventral temporal regions that are more generally involved in visual 
object recognition. In contrast, artifacts and their associated properties have most often been 
localized to posterior temporal and pre-motor areas, near to regions involved in object motion 
and manipulation. In this regard, the representation of semantic categories would seem to be 
reduced to the constituent features of the particular category being represented and the analogous 
sensory-motor regions of cortex necessary for perceptually encoding this information. However, 
it is not yet clear if this direct relationship between perceptual experiences of object and semantic 
knowledge of those items applies across all possible sensory modalities.  This predicted 
relationship between the sensory encoding of object properties and knowledge of them is the 
subject of the first experiment presented in Chapter 2. 
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 1.6. General and specific contributions of the prefrontal cortex to semantic processing 
The prefrontal cortex is most likely responsible for helping us sort through conflicting 
evidence in semantic memory to determine with conviction whether a peripheral, or borderline, 
item is a member of the given category. This brain region has been implicated in the laying down 
of new memories in coordination with temporal cortices, controlled retrieval selection processes 
in semantic memory, and perceptual classification, as well more general cognitive control in 
initiating and maintaining goal states. Interestingly, single-unit recording studies have shown 
how perceptual classification and the learning of rules may be implemented at the neuronal level 
in prefrontal cortices of monkeys (Miller, Freedman, & Wallis, 2002). Indeed, the prefrontal 
cortex would seem to be the ideal place to investigate the functional architecture for abstract, and 
relational, information about items in the world as it occupies a far greater portion in the human 
brain than in other animals (Fuster, 1995).  The role of prefrontal cortex, usually left anterior and 
inferior areas if not a finer segregation (for discussion see Fiez, 1997), in semantic memory 
retrieval is presently unclear. This region may serve both to represent abstract properties of 
objects while using these representations in the service of more general semantic processing 
mechanisms.  
The prefrontal cortex has been widely implicated in semantic memory encoding. For 
instance, left inferior prefrontal cortex shows increased activation during semantic encoding 
relative to nonsemantic encoding, and the activity was decreased with additional semantic 
encoding of the same words, but not when the words were reprocessed nonsemantically (Demb 
et al., 1995). Similar semantic priming effects in inferior prefrontal areas have been widely 
reported (Bookheimer, 2002) including similar regions for pictures and words (Wagner, 
Desmond, Demb, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1997) and a task-specific fractionization of this region into 
anterior and posterior components (Wagner, Koustaal, Maril, Schacter, & Buckner, 2000). In 
36 
 addition, whether previous experiences will be remembered would seem to be predictable from 
the activation of prefrontal cortex during encoding with activity lateralized based on the modality 
of the items, with the right hemisphere more active for pictures (Brewer, Zhao, Desmond, 
Glover, & Gabrieli, 1998) and the left hemisphere more active for word stimuli (Wagner et al., 
1998). Based on these findings it should be clear that prefrontal cortex plays a crucial role in 
learning and memory especially regarding semantic knowledge.  
As reported earlier, some of the first neuroimaging investigations of cognition (Petersen et 
al., 1988, 1989) found left inferior prefrontal activations for when subjects were asked to 
generate a verb to a target noun in contrast to when nouns were simply repeated. In general, 
prefrontal activity found in semantic retrieval has usually been lateralized to the left hemisphere, 
even when the task materials were nonverbal, including objects (Martin et al., 1996; 
Vandenberghe et al., 1996) and logographic characters (Tan et al., 2001). More recent work 
shows that subregions of the prefrontal cortex may be segregated based on the modality of the 
stimulus materials (McDermott, Buckner, Petersen, Kelley, & Sanders, 1999) and by the 
presented task (Roskies, Fiez, Balota, Raichle, & Petersen, 2001). More specifically, activations 
generally found in ventrolateral prefrontal cortex during both classification and generation tasks 
suggest that these areas are related to generic semantic retrieval processes (Cabeza & Nyberg, 
2000). In contrast, ventromedial prefrontal cortex is activated by classification tasks suggesting 
some sort of decision-related function during semantic retrieval and perhaps a role in 
representing abstract rules necessary for borderline semantic classifications. Lateral activations 
closer to Brocca’s area in posterior prefrontal cortex are also found during semantic retrieval 
processes that could reflect covert or overt articulation during word generation. In addition, as 
noted earlier, more dorsal regions of prefrontal cortex may be also be involved with the selective 
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 processing of tools relative to other objects. Therefore, prefrontal cortex in general may subserve 
different aspects of semantic retrieval processes including the representation of specific types of 
knowledge and mechanisms used to guide semantic decisions.  
While many studies have focused on the left inferior prefrontal cortex (LIPFC) for its 
apparent functions in semantic knowledge, its exact role remains unclear (Wagner, Pare-
Blagoev, Clark, & Poldrack, 2001). Initially, the LIPFC was thought to subserve semantic 
retrieval or semantic working memory (Petersen et al., 1989, 1988; Kapur et al., 1994; Demb et 
al., 1995; Fiez, 1997). In this regard, the LIPFC was hypothesized to be involved in the active 
‘working with’ an item, here specific for semantic information, as seemed to be true of other 
regions in prefrontal cortex (Kapur et al., 1994) for other stimulus factors in maintaining 
memories over brief intervals. More recently, it has been proposed that rather than mediate 
semantic retrieval per se, the LIPFC is specifically involved in the selection of task-relevant 
responses from among competing alternatives (Thompson Schill, D'Esposito, Aguirre, & Farah, 
1997). Thompson-Shill and colleagues (1997) varied selection demands by manipulating the 
amount of semantic distractors in a given task. For instance, in a verb generation paradigm, 
subjects covertly produced an associated verb with a target noun. The nouns were varied so that 
they had many associated verbs (‘high-selection’: rope ? hang, tie, lasso, etc.) or one dominant 
verb (‘low selection’: scissors ? cut). They found that, in comparison to when the subjects 
simple read the verbs, activity was greater for both generate conditions in the LIPFC. Critically, 
when the selection conditions were compared directly, activity in the LIPFC was greater for the 
high-selection condition. They argue that this result indicates the LIPFC is more generally 
involved with selection of responses in general from among competing alternatives, rather than 
simply as a semantic retrieval mechanism.  
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 Wagner and colleagues (Wagner et al., 2001) have recently tested this proposal by examining 
activity in the LIPFC while selection demands were held constant. Participants were presented 
with a cue (e.g., candle) and had to decide which of a few alternatives was most globally related 
to the cue. In order to manipulate the level of controlled retrieval, the possible correct 
alternatives varied and were either strongly (e.g., flame) or weakly (e.g., halo) related to the cue. 
They predicted that if the LIPFC mediates controlled semantic retrieval then weaker associate 
strength should elicit greater LIPFC activation even as selection demands were held constant. 
Wagner et al. (2001) supported this prediction, suggesting that LIPFC mediates a top-down bias 
signal that is recruited to the extent that semantic memory retrieval requires controlled 
processing. In further support of this proposal, low frequency words activate left prefrontal areas 
when subjects are asked to make a semantic relatedness judgment further implicating this area in 
controlled semantic retrieval (Chee, Hon, Caplan, Lee, & Goh, 2002). In general, the LIPFC 
indicates the ways that semantic memory is processed when the relative processing demands are 
increased. However, in cases where associative strength of becomes weaker, other more abstract 
semantic representations are likely to bridge the gap. The LIPFC may therefore represent an 
ideal location for resolving difficult category boundaries when accessing perceptually conflicting 
semantic features through the use of rule-based features coded indirectly in the language system. 
Seminal two-stage models in categorization (Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 1974; Armstrong, 
Gleitman, & Gleitman, 1983) predict that when category decisions become more difficult for 
more borderline cases, response times for verification increases. Based on the role of prefrontal 
cortex in mediating controlled semantic memory retrieval and selection, the second stage of 
category processing is likely implemented here or in adjacent cortical regions. That is, very easy 
category judgments (e.g. Is a ‘dog’ a ‘mammal’?) are said to bypass the second stage completely, 
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 perhaps relying exclusively on category prototypes, perhaps in more posterior regions within 
inferior occipitotemporal cortex for a simple pattern match of the item and a summation of the 
average features within the category. However, when the decision becomes more difficult in 
borderline cases (e.g. Is a ‘dolphin’ a mammal?), the second stage representing the processing of 
abstract, or relational, properties (e.g., Does it breathe air?; Does it give birth to live young?) 
becomes necessary. This second stage seems to rely on rule-like semantic knowledge processed 
within prefrontal cortex. Recent evidence from Smith, Patalano, and colleagues (Smith, Patalano, 
& Jonides, 1998; Patalano, Smith, Jonides, & Koeppe, 2001) supports this prediction.  
Participants were taught to use either a rule or to memorize individual exemplars when 
learning to visually categorize a set of novel animal-like stimuli that varied on ten dimensions 
(e.g., body markings and tail shape). During each stimulus block the rule was changed to prevent 
subjects from simply relying on memorized prototypes of the test items (see Experiment 2 in 
Patalano et al., 2001). The results showed that bilateral prefrontal cortical areas were activated in 
the rule condition but not in the exemplar memorization condition, even when time-on-task was 
controlled for, suggesting more directly that prefrontal areas engage in the type of feature 
processing required by the second stage of seminal categorization models. In this regard, 
prefrontal cortex would seem more generally to mediate the type of semantic processes 
necessary to resolve difficult category boundaries. 
We have recently used a category verification task in an event-related neuroimaging design 
to specifically address how borderline category membership is resolved (Goldberg, Perfetti, & 
Schneider, 2003). Based on prior behavioral results (Goldberg, submitted) it was expected that 
plants (e.g., daisy, pine, etc.) would be more difficult than mammals to classify as living things 
since young children tend to deny that plants are alive because of their perceived lack of 
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 movement (Carey, 1985). In addition, it was expected that items with visual properties more 
similar to typical living things would cause greater behavioral difficulty than those instances 
sharing no features with the category. For example, since natural moving things (i.e., ‘cloud’ and 
‘river’) share the features of ‘movement’ and ‘naturalness’ with the category living thing, 
subjects were expected to have greater difficulty denying category membership to these items, in 
contrast to an easier behavioral verification for artifacts, as we found in previous behavioral 
work (Goldberg, submitted). This added semantic difficulty was expected to drive prefrontal 
regions, esp. the LIPFC, based on the predicted role of these areas in representing higher-order 
conceptual associations, perhaps rules, and in controlling semantic retrieval demands.  
As expected, the contrast between plants and mammals yielded greater activity in the LIPFC 
for plants. This activity in LIPFC may explain how the added difficulty for plants is resolved, 
perhaps via abstract properties (e.g., ‘grow’ and reproduce’). In contrast, mammals activated 
bilateral occipitotemporal regions implicated in visual object processing and color knowledge. 
This result further replicates the neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence that shows a 
selective reliance on these visual regions by animal stimuli, perhaps based on a selective reliance 
on visual properties. As for the nonliving items, natural moving things (e.g., ‘river’ and ‘cloud’) 
led to greater activation in the LIPFC, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), likely for similar reasons. Items that cause confusions in young 
children are more likely resolved through the acquisition and use of explicit rules, represented in 
the language system. In addition to replicating previous findings, these results suggest that the 
LIPFC is specifically activated whenever abstract properties are required. However, this finding 
is conflated with an increase in response time for these same items. The LIPFC may therefore 
represent abstract semantic properties or may more generally subserve semantic decisions as the 
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 response demands increase. The second experiment of this dissertation was specifically designed 
to test this prediction and is presented in Chapter 3 below. 
The prefrontal cortex, based on the neuropsychological literature and more recent 
neuroimaging findings, appears to be intricately involved in representing and processing higher-
order relational information and abstract rules. This area of cortex is the ideal candidate region 
for instantiating the second stage of seminal categorization models and more generally retrieving 
the information about a given item or category, perhaps by coordinated processing with more 
posterior brain regions. This region could also play a vital role in the active simulation of 
perceptual symbols necessary to resolve complex linguistic relations. The prefrontal cortex has 
been implicated in the controlled retrieval of semantic knowledge, relevant for selecting among 
competing alternatives, and in representing abstract rules. It is not yet clear whether any of these 
theories is sufficient to explain the functional significance and breadth of this region. 
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 2. Experiment 1: Sensory brain regions represent perceptual properties 
 
While there is much to evidence to suggest that semantic knowledge specifically relies on 
sensory brain regions, this conclusion is extensively debated (see for example Caramazza & 
Mahon, 2003). If object knowledge relies on brain regions involved in object perception, 
symbolic representations in language would seem to be directly related to the experiences to 
which they refer (Barsalou, 1999). Based on the previous neuropsychological and neuroimaging 
evidence, the first experiment predicted that perceptual semantic features are widely distributed 
throughout sensory cortical regions depending on the roles of those areas in encoding the 
relevant experiences with the associated objects. That is, sensory brain regions were expected to 
support perceptual semantic decisions in each sensory modality.  
Though previous neuropsycholgical and neuroimaging studies have strongly suggested 
that sensory brain regions support perceptual knowledge of objects, it is not clear whether this 
relationship between perception and conception applies more broadly across all of the sensory 
modalities as a principle of knowledge representation. In addition, the use of different paradigms 
and stimulus classes has made clear interpretations difficult. This experiment used a common 
property verification task to probe knowledge of objects across all of the sensory modalities. 
Furthermore, by examining the activation of these regions and the LIPFC as response latency 
increases in modality-specific decisions, it will be possible to discriminate among multiple 
models of semantic processing. 
The functional role of the LIPFC is typicality described as mediating semantic decisions 
when response times increase, perhaps to account for the necessity of selection (Thompson-
Schill et al., 1999) or increasing controlled retrieval (Wagner et al., 2001). However, it is not 
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 clear to what extent this region mediates modality-general or modality-specific semantic control 
and whether LIPFC co-activates with sensory association cortices (see for example, Gold & 
Buckner, 2002). By controlling for response times within and across sensory property 
verifications, this experiment will examine the degree to which prefrontal and sensory regions 
co-activate during the resolution of semantic decisions. It addition, it will be possible to examine 
whether activity in LIPFC is influenced, or subdivides, by the decision modality. This 
experiment generally addresses how semantic information may be both highly distributed to 
disparate regions and integrated through processing in the LIPFC. 
With increasing response times, there are at least three theoretical predictions for how 
modality-specific semantic regions may show increased activation either independent of or in 
conjunction with the LIPFC. First, feature-based accounts generally assume that semantic 
attributes (Martin et al., 1995) can be localized to specific regions of cortex. These areas may be 
sufficient to support sensory property decisions even when response times increase. In contrast, 
two stage models of semantic processing generally predict that modality-specific attributes will 
be used when sufficient to resolve semantic decisions (Smith et al., 1974). Supplementary 
abstract information (perhaps via inferior prefrontal cortices as addressed below in Exp. 2) may 
be used as necessary to resolve decisions with increasing difficulty. Lastly, controlled retrieval 
models (Wagner et al., 2001) would predict that LIPFC activations track with modality-specific 
regions as difficulty increases. This experiment aims to distinguish among these alternatives by 
examining how activity correlates with response times in modality-specific semantic decisions. 
Feature-based accounts may predict that the spatial extent of activity in sensory regions 
will increase with response times during modality-specific decisions but with no other areas 
showing differential activation patterns. Alternatively, with increasing response times, the 
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 features used during modality-specific decisions may elicit increasing activation in the prefrontal 
cortex but not in modality-specific regions. This pattern of results would support a two-stage 
model of semantic processing in which the modality-specific regions pass information to a 
second stage, perhaps represented by the LIPFC, as decisions become increasingly difficult.  
However, if increasing response times correlate with increased activity in both prefrontal and 
modality-specific regions, a controlled retrieval model would be supported.  That is, the LIPFC 
may aid in controlling processing in modality-specific regions as semantic decisions become 
increasingly difficult, perhaps through selecting the relevant features for the decision at-hand. 
Furthermore, two-stage models and dynamic processing theories may be explained in 
terms of dedicated connections between the LIPFC and sensory brain regions (Gold & Buckner, 
2002). These connections may drive semantic control processes or inferior prefrontal cortex may 
process semantic information independent of input modality. The first experiment is also 
designed to test these predictions: whether the LIPFC can be fractionated by semantic modality 
or whether this area operates as a modality-general semantic processing region. If the LIPFC 
represents a modality-based topography of control regions, then it should subdivide based on the 
modality of the property verification. Alternatively, if the LIPFC processes semantic information 
independent of semantic modality, then no such subdivision should be evident across the 
sensory-based property verifications. By examining activity in the LIPFC as semantic modality 
is varied, this experiment aims to investigate the top-down role of this region in controlling the 
activation of semantic properties in sensory brain regions.  
The first experiment aimed to examine the degree to which sensory regions and left 
inferior prefrontal cortex (LIPFC) co-activate during the resolution of difficult semantic 
decisions. Specifically, this experiment is designed to test theoretical predictions regarding how 
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 semantic processing may be localized to modality-specific brain regions and rely upon a 
distributed semantic network that is sensitive to increases in response time. This experiment 
therefore examined how semantic knowledge may be both highly distributed to sensory cortical 
regions and accessed with increasing control depending upon task demands. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
 Fifteen right-handed, native American-English speakers (mean: 21.87; range: 18 – 27;     
8 males) from the University of Pittsburgh community volunteered to participate in this fMRI 
study. Due to excessive head motion (> 3 mm) during the scanning session, the data of one 
female participant was not included for group analyses. The exclusion of this participant resulted 
in a slightly younger sample (mean: 21.86). All participants were unaware of the specific 
purposes of the study but were informed that the research was being conducted to examine how 
the human brain represents word meaning. The same participants contributed to this experiment 
and Experiment 2 presented below. 
 
General Procedures 
Prior to the experiment every participant completed a brief version of the property 
verification paradigm (described below) so they could become familiar with the task constraints 
including the nature of and time required for responses. In this practice version of the paradigm, 
items and properties were presented that did not appear during the actual experiment. The 
participant completed this practice version while seated at a standard computer and responses 
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 were conveyed through keyboard button presses that corresponded to the fingers required for 
operating the button response unit (BRU) in the MRI scanner. To mimic the noisy environment 
of the MRI scanner, participants heard through headphones a recording of the repetitive 
knocking sound made by the scanner. 
All MRI scanning was conducted at the Brain Imaging Research Center of the University 
of Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University on a 3-Tesla head-only Siemens Allegra magnet. 
Participants were required to lie in a supine position with their heads inside the magnet bore and 
viewed the stimulus display through a mirror positioned in front of their eyes that reflected the 
projection screen positioned behind their head. Passive restraints (e.g., compressible pillows) 
were used to lessen participant head motion. 
The scanning session began with the collection of scout, in-plane, and volume anatomical 
series while functional scans corresponded to runs of the experiment. The scout images were 
used to position the straight-axial in-plane series (T1-weighted inversion recovery pulse 
sequence) at a slice prescription parallel to the inferior aspect of the temporal lobes of each 
participant. The 45 slices of this series provided almost full coverage of the brain for all 
participants. The volume anatomical scan was acquired using the Siemens MPRAGE sequence 
which allows for a three dimensional reconstruction of each participants brain and thus more 
precise anatomical localization with a resolution of approximately 1 mm3. The in-plane structural 
scan served as the anatomical reference for all functional series which were collected in the same 
slices using a T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) pulse sequence (TE = 30, TR = 3000, 
FOV = 210, slice thickness = 3.0 mm with no gap between slices, flip angle = 90, in-plane 
resolution = 3.125 mm2). Functional data were collected in 4 separate runs with two successive 
runs devoted to each experiment. Each run in both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 lasted for 7 
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 minutes 42 seconds, and included 151 image acquisitions, with the order of the experiments 
counterbalanced across participants. The first three image acquisitions of each run were 
automatically discarded by the scanner and corresponded to the instruction period for the first 
property verification block. All verification trials corresponded to one functional acquisition (i.e., 
scanner TR for EPI sequence = trial length) therefore for both experiments the paradigm was a 
mixed event-related design with verification questions blocked. In the first experiment, the event 
trials correspond to easy and hard items. 
During each experiment, participants were asked to determine whether an item (e.g., 
‘lettuce’) possesses a given property (‘green’), a so-called property verification task. The four 
target properties (e.g., ‘green’ or ‘lays eggs’) of each experiment (see below) were kept constant 
across the experiment while the items to which participants affirmed or denied the given property 
were randomly varied.  Property verification questions were presented in blocks of six trials with 
each trial sequence three seconds in length. An equal number of affirmative and negative items, 
48 trials of each, were presented for each verification question and within each block of eight 
trials. Participants had up to 1500 milliseconds (ms) to respond to each stimulus items regarding 
whether or not it possessed the given property. Affirmative responses were always indicated with 
a button press associated with the right index finger on the BRU, while negative responses were 
always associated with a right middle finger button press.  Stimuli were followed by the 
presentation of a central fixation cross (+) for 1500 ms. After the eight trials of each verification 
block, an instruction screen was presented for eight seconds to orient the participant to the 
verification question in the subsequent block. A fixation cross was presented after the 
introduction screen for one second to prepare the participant for the subsequent trial. Property 
verification questions were randomly presented six times within each functional run of the 
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 scanner for a total of twelve repetitions across the two runs devoted to each experiment. A total 
of 96 trials were presented for each verification question. The stimuli for both experiments are 
presented in Appendix C. 
 
Design of Experiment 1 
In the first experiment, four verification questions were presented (see Table 1) which 
varied across each sensory modality. In this regard, ‘modality’ refers to the sensory input (i.e., 
visual, auditory, tactile, or olfactory/gustatory) used to code a given semantic feature. Some 
modality-specific semantic regions have been previously identified and tend to rely on primary 
and secondary sensory areas, and so for each sensory modality, specific cortical regions were 
expected to be preferentially activated by perceptual properties in that modality. Based on prior 
research, a visual property was expected to rely on the ventral temporal cortex (Martin et al., 
1995), an auditory property was expected to activate the superior temporal gyrus (James & 
Gauthier, 2003), and an olfactory/gustatory property was expected to drive the orbitofrontal 
cortex (Goldberg, Perfetti, & Schneider, 2002). As the processing of gustatory and olfactory 
sensory input does not seem well distinguished in the human brain, we did not separately test 
properties of each type. To our knowledge, no prior research has shown areas in the 
somatosensory cortex to be active during a tactile semantic judgment though we expected such 
activation for a property of this sensory modality. Therefore, we expected that the sensory brain 
regions associated with the perceptual encoding of each modality would also support semantic 
properties associated with that specific input. This experiment therefore consisted of a blocked 
design in which eight consecutive trials were presented within each semantic modality allowing 
for 24 seconds for the hemodynamic response to peak and return to baseline.  
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 Within each verification question, affirmative and negative items were varied with regard 
to the time typically required to verify the given property for each item. In this regard, 
‘difficulty’ refers to the average response time for subjects to verify a given property across the 
set of items presented for each verification question. Items within each question were classified 
(see again Table 1) using a median split to produce sets of ‘easy’ (i.e., typically responded to in 
~700 ms) and ‘hard’ (i.e., ~800 ms) items from norming data with behavioral-only participants. 
Both affirmative and negative items were categorized in this way to examine the effects of 
increasing response time on activity in sensory brain regions and in supporting semantic retrieval 
mechanisms in the prefrontal cortex. Within each property block, easy and hard items were 
equally and randomly presented as ‘events’ with each trial associated with one volume 
acquisition. This fast event-related design produced a ‘jitter’ to better allow for the 
deconvolution of effects associated with semantic difficulty. With the verification questions 
presented as blocks, this mixed design allowed for statistical comparisons between the modality 
verifications and the event trial types. 
A visuo-motor letter detection task with nonword stimuli (i.e., Does ‘contain the letter 
‘i’?) was used to localize prefrontal regions specifically involved in semantic processing and as a 
further test of the semantic role of modality-specific sensory regions. The trial and block 
presentation of this control task was identical to the perceptual property verifications and was 
randomly interspersed throughout each run of the experiment. 
 
Materials 
For each property verification, norming experiments with behavioral-only participants 
(see Appendix B) were used to: 1) ensure that item-property relations within each question relied 
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 on perceptual knowledge to the same degree; 2) identify clearly affirmative and negative items 
and items that vary according to ‘difficulty’; and 3) match the set of items within each question 
for possibly confounding lexical factors. One set of behavioral-only participants rated the degree 
to which they knew the relationship between the given item and a property. Based on a five-point 
scale, participants indicated whether they knew the relationship from having directly experienced 
it (‘sensory’) or having read about it or been taught it (‘abstract’). The modality-specific 
questions used in this experiment were matched on this scale. This method was also used to 
identify the sensory and abstract questions used in Experiment 2. Another set of behavioral-only 
participants performed the property verification decision on a superset of properties and items 
used in the experiment. Their accuracy data was then used to segregate affirmative and negative 
items while eliminating any item for which the property relationship was not clear. That is, any 
any item for which the property was affirmed or denied between 40% and 60 of the time was not 
included in the stimulus set (see Response in Appendix C).  In contrast, their response time data 
was used to classify easy and hard instances within the affirmative and negative item sets of each 
verification question. Hard and easy items within each modality were separated on average by 
about 100 ms (see RT in Appendix C). Affirmative and negative items within each modality 
were drawn from the same superordinate categories. Stimuli in the letter detection blocks 
consisted of pronounceable nonwords constructed from rearranged letters of words used in the 
sensory property verifications.  
Easy and hard trials within each modality, as well as all items across all property 
verification questions, were matched for (see Appendix B) letter length (Avg. = 5.96), 
phonological length (Avg. = 1.91), and lexical familiarity (Avg. = 0.29).  
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 Statistical Analyses 
Neuroimaging data was preprocessed and analyzed using the BrainVoyager 2000 
(BrainInnovation, Inc.) software. Preprocessing steps included: 6-parameter, 2D motion-
correction, slice scan time correction using sinc interpolation, voxel-wise linear detrending, and 
spatial smoothing with a 8 mm full-width half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel. These 
processing steps are necessary to account for intersession and intersubject variance including 
scanner artifacts, head motion, and neuroanatomical differences. To allow for group composite 
results, spatial normalization was performed using the standard 9-parameter landmark method of 
Talairach and Tournoux (1988). For analyses, a general linear model was defined for each 
subject that included five regressors which modeled the BOLD response to each 24 second block 
period (4 trials) associated with the presentation of each property verification block and the 
control condition. Each regressor was convolved with a standard gamma model of the 
hemodynamic impulse-response function (Boynton, Engel, Glover, Heeger, 1996). The resulting 
statistical maps from the contrasts described below were thresholded for significance and cluster 
size (>= 5 contiguous voxels). Any resulting region-of-interest (ROI) analyses transformed the 
arbitrary values of the neuroimaging data to a more informative measure of percent signal 
change. This latter measure assumed the run average as the baseline activity and computed the 
variation of each data point in each run from this baseline.  
Contrasts in the neuroimaging data were made within and between the verification 
questions. Conjunction analyses of all pair-wise comparisons with the modality of interest were 
used to localize the activity in distinct sensory cortical regions predicted for each modality-
specific decision. For example, to localize regions specific to the auditory property verification, a 
conjunction analysis of all pair-wise contrasts (i.e., Loud – Green, Loud – Soft, Loud – Sweet, 
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 and Loud – Control) revealed the overlap map of all voxels at significance for each comparison. 
This test is the most conservative for ensuring that only those areas activated by the predicted 
sensory modality, but not the others, will reach threshold in the statistical maps. Regions-of-
interest were determined a priori using landmark coordinates based on previous research findings 
and known locations of primary sensory regions. Activity in these regions for each of the 
property verification decisions was then analyzed using single sample t-tests to examine the 
probability against chance of a significant increase from baseline activity. Candidate semantic 
regions in the prefrontal cortex were localized by contrasting all semantic verification blocks 
with the nonword letter detection task, and overlapping the resulting statistical map with one 
from the direct contrast between hard and easy trials.  To examine the effects of ‘difficulty’ on 
activity in modality-specific regions and the prefrontal cortex, paired-sample t-tests were used to 
examine activity differences between easy and hard trials in regions-of-interest defined through 
the above comparisons. The effect of response time on activity in these regions was then 
examined to test the theoretical predictions of feature-based, two-stage, and dynamic processing 
theories. Activity in prefrontal regions was also examined for modality-specific effects between 
areas based upon possible dedicated connections to posterior brain regions. Behavioral data was 
examined using paired-sample t-tests to analyze significant effects of modality, based on 
response time differences between property verification decisions, and difficulty, based on 
response time differences between all easy and hard trials within each modality and across the 
sensory modalities. Single factor ANOVA tests were used to examine the main effect of 
semantic difficulty between easy and hard trial types.  
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 Behavioral Results 
 The behavioral results show few differences between sensory modalities but do support 
the difficulty manipulation between easy and hard items within each modality. Among the 
sensory verifications, the visual property was responded to slightly more quickly, by about 30 
milliseconds (ms), than the auditory and tactile decisions (see Figure 1; t’s > 2.4, p’s < .05). All 
other response time differences between the sensory modalities were not significant. Participants 
were slightly more accurate for the auditory verification, by about 5 %, than for the gustatory 
property (t = 3.0, p < .05). No other accuracy differences between the modalities were found. 
The letter detection control was responded to more than 160 ms faster (t’s > 9.87, p’s < .001) and 
6% more accurately (t’s > 5.25, p’s < .001) than all of the sensory decisions. Overall, the 
accuracy of neuroimaging participants was 90%, indicating that the responses for items greatly 
matched the responses given by the participants in the behavioral norming studies. Here the 
neuroimaging participants were accurate on: 90% of the trials for the visual decision, 92% of 
auditory trials, 89% of the tactile items, and 87% of the items for the gustatory verification, 
while accuracy for the control condition was 97%. 
As expected, based on the manipulation of item response time, there were main effects of 
difficulty across the sensory decisions. Easy items were responded to on average about 80 ms 
faster than hard items (F = 19.36, p <.001) and about 8% more accurately (F = 33.72, p <.001). 
Similarly as expected, within all of the perceptual properties, easy and hard trials, as defined a 
priori from the norming experiments, differed significantly between 65 to 100 ms (t’s > 3.91, p < 
.001; for details see Figure 2). When using the actual data from the neuroimaging participants, 
the average response time difference between easy and hard items increases to about 275 ms (F = 
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 212.09, p < .001) and within the sensory modalities this difference ranges from about 260 to 295 
ms (t’s > 15.16, p’s < .001; see Figure 3).  
 
Neuroimaging Results 
The cortical distribution of perceptual property knowledge to sensory brain regions 
Sensory brain regions were activated by the verification of perceptual properties across 
the four sensory modalities at a significance threshold of p < .01 (uncorrected). The sensory 
modality directed examined in each property verification question was specifically associated 
with the most robust increases in activation of the predicted sensory brain regions (see Table 2). 
This activity did not vary across affirmative and negative items. The visual property verification 
was specifically associated with increased activity in the left ventral temporal cortex (Figure 4a; 
x: -59, y: -46, z: -6), a region previously shown to be involved in the representation of object 
color knowledge and more generally involved in processing features used in visual object 
recognition. This ventral temporal activity differs significantly (t = 3.81, p <.01) by .15% from 
the average activity over the course of the runs while none of the other property decisions show 
such selective increases (Figure 4b). In addition, this verification decision was also associated 
with increased activity in superior parietal regions implicated in judgments of object form 
(Oliver & Thompson-Schill, 2003). By comparison semantic property decisions regarding 
whether items ‘sound loud’ was specifically associated with increased activity centered on the 
left superior temporal sulcus (STS) just inferior to primary auditory cortex (Figure 5a). The STS 
has been implicated in the integration of visual and auditory knowledge and in retrieving sounds 
associated with objects. Activity in this region increased significantly by about .075% (t = 2.01, 
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 p <.05) for the auditory property verification in contrast to the average baseline and decreased 
activity for the other verifications (Figure 5b).  
We expected the somatosensory cortex to show the greatest relative increase in activity 
for the tactile decision based on the predicted relationship between sensory encoding and 
perceptual object knowledge. Somewhat, but not too, surprisingly, verification of whether items 
‘feel soft’ was associated with increased activity in left lateralized regions including the 
somatosensory cortex but also in the primary motor cortex and pre-motor cortex (Figure 6a). The 
tactile property decision led to activation increases in the somatosensory cortex of the left post-
central gyrus by about .1% signal change over and above average activity (t = 3.69, p <.01) in 
contrast to the other sensory modalities (Figure 6b). The primary motor cortex in the left pre-
central gyrus (Figure 6c) and a pre-motor region in the left prefrontal cortex (Figure 6d) showed 
similar patterns of activation of about .1% specific for the tactile property (t = 3.83, p <.01) but 
not for the other verification decisions. This robust activity throughout left-lateralized motor and 
somatosensory regions would seem to indicate the off-line simulation of tactile properties 
through a gestural movement toward the associated object.  
As predicted, the verification of whether an item ‘tastes sweet’ was associated with 
specific increased activity in the left orbitofrontal cortex (Figure 7a). The gustatory modality 
(Figure 7b) shows a significant increase of .15% relative to the run average baseline (t = 3.29, p 
<.01), in contrast to the other sensory modalities. This result provides direct support for our 
previous interpretation of the role of this region in the representation of gustatory properties of 
categories that require it (e.g., fruit), though here the activity is less robust in terms of spatial 
extent and is restricted to the left hemisphere.  
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 The role of sensory and prefrontal brain regions in supporting extended semantic processing 
 The relative difficulty of verifying perceptual properties was varied in order to test the 
role of sensory and prefrontal brain regions in supporting semantic processing. Contrary to 
expectations, the a priori classification of easy and hard trials, while associated with behavioral 
effects within the sensory modalities, was not associated with increased activity in the modality-
specific regions discussed above for each of the modality-specific verifications. Even when the 
actual response times of the neuroimaging participants were used to classify easy and hard trials, 
which reveal a four times increase in effect size for response times within the sensory modalities, 
no significant effects were found in the set of sensory brain regions specifically identified for 
each perceptual decision. In this regard, modality-specific sensory regions would not seem to 
interact with the difficulty of the property verification. These regions would instead seem to 
contribute a threshold level of activity for the given perceptual property decisions. 
 On the other hand, prefrontal regions typically ascribed to modality-general aspects of 
cognitive control were specifically involved in more difficult sensory verifications and 
depending on the modality (see Table 2).  A region in the LIPFC (Figure 8) was associated with 
increased activity for the gustatory and tactile properties (t’s > 2.17, p < .05) but irrespective of 
item difficulty. That is, within these modalities, this region was not associated with increased 
activity for the items requiring a longer latency, as defined from the behavioral data of the 
neuroimaging participants. In contrast, the visual and auditory property verifications did not 
seem to specifically drive this region over and above the average baseline activity. However, 
within the auditory decision there was a trend toward significance (t = 1.47, p < .09) with 
increasing activity for the harder items in contrast to the less difficult items.  
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 A more dorsolateral aspect of the left prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) appears to be more 
sensitive to both the probed semantic modality and response latency.  This region (Figure 9) is 
most responsive to the tactile modality with activity increasing about .1% over the average 
baseline (t = 3.15, p < .01). While there were no differences between easy and hard trials for this 
verification decision, there was significantly increased activity for the gustatory modality. The 
more difficult verifications of whether an item ‘tastes sweet’, as defined from the behavioral data 
of the neuroimaging participants, were associated with increased activity of about .04% above 
activity for the easier trials (t = 1.91, p < .05). This specific increase in activity for harder 
gustatory verifications is reflected in a .07% increase above baseline (t = 2.28, p < .05) whereas 
the activity for easy trials did not differ from the run average. The DLPFC therefore appears 
selectively responsive to both the probed semantic modality and the difficulty with which the 
semantic properties of items are resolved. 
While these regions show increased activity for specific semantic modalities and the 
difficulty of semantic decisions, from this data there does not appear to be an organizing 
principle for the controlled retrieval of semantic knowledge in the prefrontal cortex. In this 
regard, the resolution of semantic decisions may rely on modality-specific prefrontal 
mechanisms and modality-general processes alluded to in other cognitive domains. In support of 
this interpretation, a region in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) showed increased activity for 
the more difficult property verifications across three of the four sensory modalities (Figure 9). 
Even as only the gustatory verification showed significantly sustained activity from baseline for 
all trials (t = 3.47, p <.01), the more difficult items in the auditory, tactile, as well as the 
gustatory modalities led to significantly increased activity in contrast to the easier trials (t’s > 
1.90, p’s < .05).  This involvement of the ACC would to seem to indicate its more generally 
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 described role in executive control mechanisms, specifically here in the retrieval of semantic 
knowledge, either through the detection of cognitive conflicts (MacDonald et al., 2000) or 
increasing cognitive demands (Schneider & Chein, 2003).  
 
Discussion 
This experiment tested whether sensory brain regions support the verification of perceptual 
semantic properties of object knowledge, as predicted by perceptual symbol systems (Barsalou, 
1999) and feature-based models of semantic knowledge (e.g., Martin & Chao, 2001). Across the 
visual, tactile, gustatory, and auditory modalities, perceptual property verifications of word items 
were associated with increased activity in brain regions typically ascribed to the sensory 
encoding of each modality. The left ventral temporal cortex typically associated with visual 
object recognition, but also implicated in knowledge of object colors, was specifically activated 
when participants verified whether an item looks green. The left superior temporal sulcus, a 
region involved in auditory processing, was specifically activated by the verification of whether 
an item sounds loud. Interestingly, the tactile verification specifically activated not only the 
somatosensory cortex in the left post-central gyrus, but also activated the left primary and pre-
motor cortices. This result suggests that in accessing knowledge for whether an item feels soft, 
participants simulate the action with the specific object in retrieving the answer. Finally, the 
verification of whether an item tastes sweet was associated with increased activity in the left 
orbitofrontal cortex. This region is one we have previously identified based on its distinctive 
activation for food items. Based on these results, perceptual knowledge of objects and sensory 
experiences of them appear to rely on a common neural substrate. This relationship between 
knowledge of objects and sensory experiences of them suggests how world knowledge more 
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 generally arises from our interactions with the world. In this regard, the encoding of sensory 
experiences would seem to ground later perceptual simulations independent of the objects that 
caused them.  
Perceptual symbol systems, as outlined by Barsalou (1999), are best suited to describing how 
this relationship unfolds through instances of objects and use of selective attentional mechanisms 
to home in on, and elaborate, specific attributes of those objects. The resulting symbolic 
representation of the object (e.g., a word) gradually comes to impart, or refer to, simulations of 
the experienced object. According to this theory, the verification of perceptual properties would 
therefore involve sensory mechanisms involved in experiencing the tested objects. In supporting 
this prediction, the present results suggest that such explicit control of prior sensory episodes is 
involved in the recollection of knowledge for properties like ‘green’, ‘loud’, ‘soft’, and ‘sweet’ 
across the spectrum of sensory modalities. Other properties within each of these modalities 
would similarly be expected to activate the associated sensory brain regions.   
These findings provide further support for the view that semantic knowledge is widely 
distributed throughout the cerebral cortex depending on the specific types of features involved 
(e.g., Martion & Chai, 2001), rather than through more general domain-based differences 
(Caramazza & Shelton, 1998) or even undifferentiated at the content level (Tyler & Moss, 2001). 
The topography of semantic memory would therefore seem to depend on the specific properties 
being accessed either individually or through more superordinate relations such as those within 
object categories. In this regard, these results provide converging support for the perceptual / 
functional hypothesis originally derived from category-specific effects found in some 
neuropsychological patients. The selective loss or preservation of object categories would seem 
to result from the differential reliance on specific types of properties across classes of items. 
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 Categories that rely more on visual properties (e.g., animals) are impaired with damage visual 
brain areas whereas these items are spared when lesions do not disrupt these regions. The 
prediction that follows from the present results is that category knowledge that preferentially 
relies on other attribute modalities (e.g., wines or textiles) will be specifically impaired with 
damage to the supporting sensory brain regions. Similarly, while certain categories (e.g., 
animals) may remain intact after localized damage to one modality (e.g., vision), properties of 
items are expected to be specifically impaired if damage occurs to areas supporting other sensory 
knowledge of items (e.g., barks or meows?).  
While these results suggest that sensory brain regions are intricately tied to the knowledge of 
perceptual properties, it is not clear whether these regions are automatically activated with the 
meaning of a word. That is, the retrieval demands of the verification task may have induced the 
equivalent of an imagery strategy in each of the tested sensory modalities. Alternatively, the 
retrieval of semantic knowledge associated with perceptual properties may always lead to the 
activation of sensory brain regions. In support of this latter interpretation, Hauk and colleagues 
(Hauk et al., 2004) have recently found that passive reading of motor-based words induces 
activity in the associated regions of the primary motor cortex. Participants in the MRI were 
initially asked to move their hands, feet, and tongue to map regions in motor cortex specifically 
involved in each of these movements given the somatotopic organization of this area of cortex. 
In the experiment, words like pick, kick, and lick were presented within a random stream of 
other words that did not have a motor component. Hauk et al. found that words like ‘pick’, that 
include a manual component in their meaning, were associated with increased activity not only 
in the motor cortex but to the greatest extent in the region associated with actual movements of 
the hand. Similarly, words like ‘kick’ and ‘lick’ were associated with the most robust activity 
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 increases in the regions mapped to movements of the feet and mouth respectively. These results 
suggest that sensory and motor brain regions are automatically activated by the meaning of 
words in passive reading rather than through particular task demands. 
The manipulation of item difficulty was used to examine the role of sensory and prefrontal 
brain regions in supporting extended semantic processing. Increased response time in modality-
specific semantic decisions was not associated with increased activity in the sensory brain areas. 
This overall finding argues against strictly feature-based and controlled retrieval models of 
semantic processing. Rather, prefrontal brain regions appear to selectively activate as a second 
stage in semantic verifications based on the tested modality and the difficulty of individual items.  
A region in the LIPFC was activated by the tactile and gustatory verifications, but within 
these modalities there were no differences between easy and hard trials. The visual and auditory 
modalities showed no selective activation in this region though the auditory modality exhibited a 
trend of increasing activity for the more difficult verifications of properties relating to object 
sounds. This result suggests that different regions of the prefrontal cortex support retrieval of 
semantic knowledge depending on the perceptual properties involved and the necessity of 
controlled processing mechanisms. In this regard, the controlled retrieval of semantic knowledge 
may depend on cortico-cortical pathways between prefrontal and specific sensory brain regions.  
This interpretation is supported by the activity patterns found in the DLPFC. This region was 
also specifically activated by the tactile verification without regard to the difficulty of the items. 
However, the harder gustatory decisions were associated with increased activity in this region in 
contrast to baseline activity for the easier verifications within this modality. In this regard, the 
DLPFC appears sensitive to both the modality of the semantic decision and the time in which 
that decision is resolved. This specific activation of both the LIPFC and the DLPFC for the 
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 tactile and gustatory properties is not evident from the behavioral effects. It is not clear why 
these modalities should lead to an increased reliance on prefrontal control mechanisms. These 
prefrontal regions may be more involved depending on the role of prior sensory experiences 
(e.g., direct taste or touch information) in mediating the item-property relationship, whereas 
other relationships while still based on sensory mechanisms are more likely inferred or observed 
through indirect means (e.g., a cannon firing in a movie). This hypothesis requires further testing 
to delineate the roles of direct and indirect sensory experiences on the representation of 
perceptual knowledge. 
The activation of the ACC fits with the interpretation of prefrontal regions as the second 
stage of semantic processing with constraints from the sensory modality of the decision and the 
difficulty with which it is resolved. More difficult items in the auditory, tactile, and gustatory 
modalities, led to increased activity in this region in contrast to the easier items within each of 
these modalities. This result suggests that other cognitive processes, perhaps based on the 
mediation of conflicting responses, are necessary for the more difficult property verifications. 
This interpretation of the activity in the ACC is consistent with prior models of the role of the 
prefrontal cortex in cognitive control mechanisms and extends these theories into the semantic 
domain. The lack of similar increases in modality specific sensory regions argues against strictly 
feature-based or controlled retrieval models of semantic processing.  
Sensory brain regions would appear to support semantic decisions that rely on the perceptual 
properties. These regions would seem to underlie modality-specific semantic decisions 
regardless of the difficulty of the decision and instead contribute a base level of activity from 
which the verification can be made. This activity may be akin to the contribution of whether an 
item possesses a feature in the modality with more general mechanisms necessary for resolving 
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 whether the item meets the criteria of the question. For example, auditory cortex may represent 
whether an item makes a sound while prefrontal regions resolve the scalar judgment of whether 
an item sounds ‘loud’. In this regard, the sensory regions may automatically activate for 
modality-based decisions, while prefrontal control mechanisms use this information to determine 
whether the item meets the semantic criterion  as indicated by other prefrontal regions in service 
of selections of goal-based actions (Matsumoto et al., 2003). This second stage would seem more 
necessary for more difficult decision, while very easy verifications could simply rely on the base 
level of activity in the sensory regions. A design more sensitive to individual trials would need to 
test this prediction against possible alternatives.   
These results argue against strictly feature-based accounts (e.g., Martin & Chao, 2001) and 
controlled retrieval theories (e.g., Wagner et al, 2001) that specify the LIPFC as the locus of 
extended semantic processing. Previous results identifying the LIPFC in semantic retrieval 
process may be biased by the verbal, and thus more abstract, nature of the stimulus materials, as 
further indicated by Experiment 2 below.  The prefrontal cortex more generally may be involved 
in difficult semantic decisions depending on the sensory modality involved and the necessity of 
more abstract semantic representations. Sensory brain regions may therefore contribute the 
necessary content required in a given semantic decision while prefrontal brain regions are 
selectively activated to mediate control of that content. These neuroimaging results, and their 
convergence with category-specific deficits, suggest that object categories, and word meanings 
more generally, are instantiated through neural systems used to encode the relevant sensory 
information. In this regard this experiment supports a dynamic feature-based account for the 
organization and interaction of semantic knowledge. Sensory brain regions appear to support the 
representation of perceptual properties associated with objects while prefrontal mechanisms may 
 operate over a base level of activity when necessary to resolve the semantic decision. In this 
regard, the prefrontal cortex may contribute top-down bias signals that control processing in 
posterior cortical regions (Miller & Cohen, 2001). This is a point that we will return to in the 
general discussion below. 
One problem with this sensory-based perspective is that the entirety of semantic knowledge 
cannot be reduced to perceptual terms. For instance, as described earlier, children are often 
confused by their sensory experiences with objects and must learn to inhibit prepotent responses 
based on perceptual cues to learn theoretical knowledge (e.g., Carey, 1985). Overcoming this 
difficulty involves acquiring theory-based features to describe conceptual events and situations 
that cannot be directly experienced. In this regard, perceptually-biased feature-based models do 
not specify the properties used in more abstract associations, such as when prefrontal cortices are 
shown to be involved in rule-based processing associated with perceptual categorization (Miller, 
Freedman, & Wallis, 2002). The second experiment aimed to examine the content by which 
some prefrontal brain regions operate over semantic knowledge. That is, even as the first 
experiment indicates the role of dissociable prefrontal regions in the retrieval of semantic 
knowledge, it is unclear what the grist is for this processing mill.  
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3. Experiment 2: Prefrontal regions represent abstract semantic knowledge 
 
The functional role of left inferior prefrontal cortex (LIPFC) is typicality described as 
mediating semantic decisions when response times increase (Roskies et al., 2001). However, 
semantic decision experiments that focus on the LIPFC often confound this extended processing 
with the greater abstractness of the stimulus materials (Wagner et al., 2001). It is not clear 
whether the extended processing necessary for some semantic decisions is resolved through 
abstract information stored in the LIPFC. Since neurons in the primate analogue of this region 
are seen to represent abstract rules (see for example, Wallis et al., 2001), it is necessary to 
distinguish in humans how this region may either represent abstract knowledge or is more 
generally activated by demanding semantic decisions.  
The second experiment used property verification decisions to dissociate semantic 
difficulty and degree of item-property abstractness on activity in the LIPFC. Participants were 
presented with words and asked to verify whether a property belongs to the meaning of the item. 
Property verification questions were controlled for how long, on average, it takes subjects to 
respond to all items (‘difficulty’) and the degree to which an item possesses the property through 
perceptual experience or learned indirect knowledge (‘abstractness’). By examining activity in 
LIPFC as either difficulty or abstractness is held constant, this experiment aims to clarify the role 
of this region in semantic processing. Based on these variables, it may be possible to dissociate 
anterior and posterior aspects of the LIPFC based on the control of semantic knowledge and the 
abstract content of some decisions. This result would complement the prefrontal subdivisions 
found in Experiment 1.  
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 The second experiment aims to clarify the role of the LIPFC in processing abstract 
semantic information. This experiment examined how cortical activity in the LIPFC varies 
depending on task difficulty and/or the degree to which semantic information is separated from 
perceptual experience and rather learned indirectly through the language. The goal of this 
experiment was to disambiguate the effects of semantic difficulty and the abstractness of 
semantic information on activity in the LIPFC. Abstract semantic properties may specifically 
rely on the LIPFC and may more generally explain the activation of this region during 
demanding semantic tasks. If the LIPFC is seen to support abstract semantic processing 
irrespective of response times, this evidence would further implicate this region in two-stage 
models of categorization.  
 
Methods 
Participants 
 The same participants contributed to Experiment 1 and this experiment. Group analyses 
therefore included fourteen right-handed, native American-English speakers (mean: 21.86; 
range: 18 – 27; 8 males) from the University of Pittsburgh community. 
  
Design of Experiment 2 
In the second experiment, four verification questions were presented (see Table 3) which 
varied across item-property abstractness and response difficulty. Accordingly, ‘abstractness’ 
refers to the ratings given for item-property relations depending upon whether the relationship 
relies on directly perceived experience (‘sensory’) or indirectly learned knowledge (‘abstract’). 
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 Verifications were therefore classified, based on the behavioral ratings (scaled 1 to 5 with 5 
being very abstract), as either sensory (e.g., < 3) or abstract (e.g., > 3). These ratings were 
expected to vary for each item within a property. By averaging across all items, some property 
decisions were more sensory (e.g., four legs?) and other were more abstract (e.g., can be 
trained?). In contrast, verification questions were also varied with regard to the response time 
typically required to verify the given property for each item. Therefore ‘difficulty’ refers to the 
average response time for subjects to verify a given property across the set of items presented for 
each verification question. However, in this experiment, rather than classify items as either 
‘easy’ or ‘hard’, the verification questions more generally were classified in this way based on 
the average response time across all items used within the question. That is, averaging across the 
set of items within each verification question produced decisions that were either ‘easy’ (i.e., 
average response time for the question equal to ~ 700 ms) or ‘hard’ (i.e., ~ 800 ms).  As shown 
in Table 3, this experiment therefore contrasted four questions based on whether they varied 
according to abstractness or difficulty. By controlling the materials in this way, this experiment 
independently examined the effects of ‘abstractness’ and ‘difficulty’ on activity in the LIPFC 
depending on the verification. This mixed design allowed for contrasts between the blocks of the 
verification decisions while segregating the event-related data, including one volume acquisition 
for each trial, for each incorrect response.  
A visuo-motor letter detection task (e.g., Does X have contain the letter ‘e’) was used to 
localize the LIPFC and other prefrontal regions specifically involved in semantic processing and 
the representation of abstract semantic knowledge. The trial and block presentation of this 
control task was identical to the property verification questions and was randomly interspersed 
throughout each run of the experiment.  
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 Materials 
For each property verification, norming experiments with behavioral-only subjects (see 
Appendix B) were used to: 1) identify verification questions that vary according to 
‘abstractness’; 2) identify verification questions that vary according to ‘difficulty’ and to identify 
clear affirmative and negative items within each question; and 3) match each question for 
possibly confounding lexical factors. One set of behavioral-only participants rated the degree to 
which they knew the relationship between the given item and a property. Based on a five-point 
scale, participants indicated whether they knew the relationship from having directly experienced 
it (‘sensory’) or having read about it or been taught it (‘abstract’). This method was also used to 
match the sensory verifications used in Experiment 1. Another set of behavioral-only participants 
performed the property verification decision on a superset of properties and items used in this 
experiment. Their accuracy data was used to segregate affirmative and negative items while 
eliminating any item for which the property relationship was not clear. The response times of the 
remaining items for verifying each property was then averaged to classify each potential question 
as either ‘easy’ or ‘hard’. Therefore, the behavioral data allowed for the selection of verification 
questions, through the items within them, to maximize two of the four possible extremes with 
regard to ‘difficulty’ and ‘abstractness’ (see again Table 3): 1) easy and sensory (Avg. RT = 
671.55 ms; Abstractness = 1.71); 2) hard and sensory (Avg. RT = 769.46 ms; Abstractness = 
1.72); 3) easy and abstract (Avg. RT = 710.63 ms; Abstractness = 3.54); 4) hard and abstract 
(Avg. RT = 822.81 ms; Abstractness = 3.47). Importantly, all affirmative and negative items for 
the four property decisions were drawn from the same superordinate category (i.e., organisms) 
and no items were repeated. The four property verification questions were also matched for letter 
length (Avg. = 5.78), phonological length (Avg. = 1.83), and lexical familiarity (Avg = .34). 
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 Stimuli in the letter detection control consisted of pronounceable nonwords constructed 
from rearranged letters of words used in the property verifications. This localizer task was used 
to isolate prefrontal regions specifically involved in semantic decisions. This task differed from 
the one used in the first experiment in terms of the letter detected (i.e., ‘e’ versus ‘i’) and the 
nonwords used. 
 
Statistical Analyses 
Behavioral data was examined using two factor ANOVA tests to analyze significant 
effects of abstractness and difficulty, as well their interaction. Accuracy data was used to 
specifically examine response times and neuroimaging data for correct trials only. The 
neuroimaging data was preprocessed and analyzed using procedures identical to those of the first 
experiment. Contrasts in the neuroimaging data were made between the verification questions 
based on activity differences in regions-of-interest (ROI’s). Candidate ROI’s in the prefrontal 
cortex were localized by contrasting all semantic verification blocks with the nonword letter 
detection task in a weighted GLM. To examine the independent contributions of abstractness and 
difficulty, and their interaction, on activity in these prefrontal ROI’s, two factor ANOVA tests 
were conducted on the percent change neuroimaging data.  
 
Behavioral Results 
The behavioral results show main effects of response time and accuracy for both 
abstractness and difficulty but no interaction. As shown in Figure 11, there were significant 
effects of abstractness and difficulty on overall accuracy to the property verifications. The two 
abstract questions were responded to on average about 11% less accurately than the sensory 
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 verifications (F= 52.62, p < .001). Similarly, responses for the two hard questions were generally 
about 7% less accurate than for the easy questions (F = 19.28, p < .001). The interaction of 
abstractness and difficulty on accuracy was not significant. The response time data also show 
main effects for abstractness and accuracy but no interaction (Figure 12). Participants responded 
about 110 ms slower for the two abstract questions than for the two sensory questions (F = 22.22, 
p < .001) while responding about 60 ms more slowly for the hard than for the easy verification 
decisions (F = 6.29, p < .01). Participants encountered much less difficulty on the nonword 
control task in responding, on average, in about 750 ms with an accuracy of approximately 97%. 
 
Neuroimaging Results 
Abstract property verification specifically activates the left inferior prefrontal cortex 
 By contrasting the property verifications with the nonword control task, candidate 
semantic regions were localized in the left inferior prefrontal cortex to independently investigate 
the effects of abstractness and difficulty on activity in this region. This comparison yielded two 
ROI’s in the LIPFC, one more medial and the other more lateral, specifically in the most ventral 
aspect of Broadmann Area (BA) 47 (see Table 4). The activity in both of these regions show 
main effects of abstractness but no main effect of difficulty however with noteworthy differences 
based on the interaction of these variables. The abstract property verifications produce the most 
activation in the medial aspect (Figure 13; x: -31, y: 35, z: 0), by about .1% over the perceptual 
properties (F = 7.51, p < .01) at a Bonferroni corrected threshold of p < .01. There is no 
significant effect of response time nor is there an interaction of abstractness and difficulty on 
activity in this region. However, the more lateral aspect (Figure 14), at a slightly more lenient 
Bonferroni corrected threshold of p < .05, shows both a main effect of abstractness (F = 55.09, p 
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 < .001) and a significant interaction (F = 8.87, p < .01) of abstractness with difficulty. The 
abstract properties lead to significantly increased activity in this region by about .3% over the 
perceptual verifications. Interestingly, the interaction of abstractness and response time is driven 
not by the more difficult abstract property, but rather by the easier decision. The verification of 
whether an item ‘can be trained’ leads to average increased activity of about .17% (t = 4.11, p < 
.01) over and above verifications of whether organisms lay eggs. This result may reflect how 
abstract properties depend on certain other facts in semantic knowledge and could result from 
subtle differences between these particular properties. In contrast there is no significant 
difference in activity between the two sensory verifications. The combined activity across these 
two regions suggests that rather than operate over more general semantic processing, the LIPFC 
appears to be specifically involved in processing abstract semantic properties. However, this area 
of the prefrontal cortex my not be solely responsible for the representation of this type of 
semantic knowledge. 
 
The prefrontal cortex more generally processes abstract semantic knowledge 
 The contrast between the property decisions and the letter detection control also yielded 
two additional regions in more dorsal aspects of the left prefrontal cortex, specifically in the 
middle frontal gyrus with one more anterior and the other more posterior at p < .01 (Bonferroni 
correction). These regions similarly showed significantly increased activity for the abstract 
properties in contrast to the sensory-based decisions. However, as with the more inferior regions, 
these areas also show subtle differences in terms of the interaction between abstractness and 
question difficulty. The more anterior region responds very similarly to the lateral aspect of the 
LIPFC. This region (see Figure 15) shows both a significant main effect of abstractness and a 
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 significant interaction of abstractness with response time. The abstract verifications, on average, 
led to a significant increase of .2% in contrast to the perceptual verifications (F = 20.20, p < 
.001). As in the medial LIPFC area, the significant interaction (F = 6.02, p < .05) between 
abstractness and response time in this region appears to be largely driven by an increased 
response to the easier abstract question. When participants verified whether an organism can be 
trained, activity in this region significantly increased, by about .12%, over the more difficult 
‘lays eggs’ verification (t = 2.40, p < .05). In contrast to this more anterior region, the more 
posterior dorsolateral aspect of the prefrontal cortex (x: -44, y: 21, z: 32) was responsive to the 
abstractness of the verification questions, but showed no effects of response time. The abstract 
verifications were associated with a significant increase (F = 14.53, p < .001) of .1% over the 
perceptual decisions. This DLPFC region showed no effects of behavioral response time on 
activity.  
  
Discussion 
This experiment examined the role of the prefrontal cortex in supporting abstract 
semantic decisions as response times increase. The results suggest that the LIPFC is involved in 
representing and processing abstract semantic properties in contrast to perceptual properties. 
More dorsal prefrontal regions also appear to be associated with semantic decisions as 
abstractness increases. That is, rather than indicate that one region in the prefrontal cortex is a 
simple repository for abstract properties, these results suggest that the prefrontal cortex more 
generally supports the representation and processing of this type of semantic knowledge. 
Disparate and neighboring prefrontal regions may show specializations based on a number of 
factors indicating modality-specific and domain-general mechanisms. The representation and 
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 controlled processing of semantic knowledge in the prefrontal cortex may depend not only on the 
abstractness and difficulty of the decisions but also, as indicated in Experiment 1, the sensory 
modality from which perceptual properties are derived.  
Across the tested verification questions, abstract item-property relations specifically led 
to increased activity in the left inferior and middle prefrontal cortex. This finding suggests that 
previous studies that have found prefrontal involvement in semantic tasks may not have 
sufficiently controlled for the abstractness of the stimulus materials or the specific decisions 
required. That is, the prefrontal cortex may become increasingly necessary as semantic decisions 
become more abstract, or the associations weaker (Wagner et al., 2001), rather than simply more 
difficult. This experiment controlled for the abstractness of semantic properties while all of the 
items represented concrete objects. In this way, the role of prefrontal cortex would seem to be 
more directly associated with the abstractness of the retrieved semantic information rather than 
other stimulus factors. It is important to note that these results should be qualified by pointing 
out that only two abstract properties were tested. The prediction that follows though is if 
semantic decisions are controlled for their abstractness, perhaps as suggested from the behavioral 
norming studies, prefrontal regions become increasingly necessary irrespective of the property.  
Yet this norming method raises the question of what exactly it means for semantic knowledge to 
be abstract and whether the chosen method is an adequate approach. 
In the behavioral norming experiments, participants were asked to determine the degree 
to which they knew that a given property belongs to a specific object. They rated whether they 
knew this relationship from direct sensory experiences with the objects or through more abstract 
means, like having read about or been taught the relationship. In this regard the abstractness of 
the item-property relationship was defined through relying either on perceptual or verbal 
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 knowledge. The instructions for this behavioral norming were slightly modified from previous 
experiments in which participants are asked to rate on a 7-point scale the concreteness of 
particular lexical items (see for example Toglia & Battig, 1978). For example, in these ratings an 
item like ‘table’ is rated as very concrete while an item like ‘justice’ is rated as very abstract. 
Since the aim of the second experiment was to examine the abstractness of item-property 
relations, the instructions for the norming study (see Appendix B) were altered to redirect 
participants to their knowledge of properties that belong to a given item. The instructions 
required participants to rate whether they knew that concrete items had a given property through 
direct sensory experiences with objects with or more indirectly through the language, such as 
having been taught or read about the relationship. The important point is that this rating was 
based on a sliding scale and so differences between properties are likely more a matter of degree 
than of kind, especially since all of the items represented concrete organisms, and could be 
directly experienced. Yet this norming dimension may be one of a few possibilities for how 
semantic abstractness may be judged and manipulated.  
Barsalou (2003) has recently identified at least six possible senses of abstraction and the 
ways in which it can be described. Category knowledge (i) refers to the abstraction away from 
the experience of individual exemplars to form a lexical representation independent of them. In 
this regard, ‘chair’ refers to the set of items in the world that tend to share a certain physical 
structure with a given intended usage. Two additional senses of abstraction refer to either the 
behavioral ability to generalize across such category members (ii) or the sense in which a given 
abstraction, such as ‘chair’, can be stored as summary representation in memory (iii). The 
difficulty with this third sense is in the type of format this stored representation takes and 
theories differ according to whether this summary representation is a prototype of shared features 
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 (e.g., Rosch & Mervis, 1975), an explicit feature (e.g., Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 1974), or even a 
set of connection weights (e.g., Rogers & McClelland, 2004). Barsalou (2003) also identifies 
three additional senses which abstraction refers to: (iv) schematic representations less specific 
than individual exemplars that (e.g., the geon theory of object recognition - Biederman, [1987]), 
(v) flexible representations in which a given abstraction can be applied independent of particular 
relations to things in the world, and finally (vi) abstract concepts, as studied in the traditional 
norming studies, in which lexical items can refer to concrete objects, like ‘tiger’, or more abstract 
ideas, like ‘justice’. Barsalou (2003) suggests that the third sense, rather than depend on static 
summary representations, arises from how such relationships develop from dynamic simulations 
of objects and their constituent properties.  
According then to these senses, abstract properties of concrete items, of the type 
examined in this experiment, may arise from category relations (e.g., mammal), the behavioral 
tendency to form such abstractions, or stored representations in memory that may or may not be 
strictly categorical (e.g., things that fly). In addition, by relying on norming studies that draw on 
the distinction between abstract and concrete word meanings, this experiment more generally 
illustrates how the particular representations, or simulations of them, may change based on the 
semantic content involved. For instance, while the four feet of a coyote may be directly 
experienced through the visual system, that a coyote can or can not be trained would seem to 
require knowledge independent of what it looks like or how it behaves. In this regard, the 
language system may provide more indirect knowledge associated with particular items but not 
necessarily reliant on any particular category relation or modality.  
Abstract properties may be also bound more tightly to the context in which they are 
generated and requiring particular events or circumstances in a given situation (Wiemer-Hastings 
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 et al., 2001). These contextual relations may be more likely to be mediated through linguistic 
knowledge rather than stored as language-specific representations, as indicated by the norming 
studies for abstract properties. So, for instance, ‘lays eggs’ and ‘can be trained’ appear to require 
specific contexts and the ability to verify the property may depend on the availability of a 
dynamic simulation for a surrounding context. In the ‘lays eggs’ property, the relationship to 
‘owl’ was rated as less abstract (see Appendix C.) than the relationship to ‘termite’, perhaps 
because of the availability of concepts like ‘nest’ and ‘hatching’. Similarly, within ‘can be 
trained’, the relationship to ‘lion’ was rated as less abstract than ‘leopard’ perhaps because of 
simulations associated with ‘circus’ and ‘whip’. A neuroimaging design more sensitive to 
individual trials could differentiate the effect of contextual constraints on item-property relations 
a one source of abstractness. More abstract concepts, like ‘justice’ and ‘truth’, activate a 
frontotemporal network of cortical regions which may be driven by the necessity of generating 
and maintaining a sentential context for these items (Noppeney & Price, 2004). 
As indicated in the neuropsychological literature, the prefrontal cortex would seem to be 
biased to represent knowledge that relies more on the language system than on perceptually-
based properties. In support of this anterior-posterior dissociation, patients with damage to 
prefrontal areas are shown to have difficulty with verbal definitions. In contrast, individuals with 
category-specific impairments for identifying objects within a visual category, based on damage 
to ventral temporal regions, can still access semantic knowledge that relies more on verbal facts. 
As reviewed earlier, we have also found in related neuroimaging work that the verification of life 
status for plants and non-living natural kinds leads to increased activity in the prefrontal cortex. 
These types of instances initially cause confusions for young children and it is only through the 
acquisition of defining, and theory-based, features that they eventually learn the correct 
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 classifications. In this regard, the increased activation in the left inferior and middle prefrontal 
cortex may indicate the role of the language system in developing knowledge about the world. 
The left inferior prefrontal cortex would seem to support information about objects that cannot 
be directly experienced and so must necessarily coded through the language. 
A curious result involves the increased activity in two of the observed prefrontal regions 
for the easier abstract verification question. When participants resolved whether an organism 
‘can be trained’, these two prefrontal regions were associated with increased activity in contrast 
to the more difficulty verification of whether the items could ‘lay eggs’.  This result suggests that 
the prefrontal cortex may fractionate into subnetworks specifically involved in some semantic 
functions but not others. While further work is necessary to test this prediction, the spatial 
relationship of these two regions being more lateral and anterior suggest another control function 
in processing abstract semantic knowledge, perhaps involving the binding of abstract properties 
to a referent. In contrast, the more medial and posterior regions show no such sensitivity to the 
difficulty-based differences and rather were associated specifically with the more abstract 
verification decisions. The prefrontal cortex may therefore subdivide into regions more involved 
in the representation of abstract semantic knowledge and regions more involved in the 
processing of that knowledge but assisted by the abstract representations or general processing 
mechanisms, like generating an extensional context, more likely to be engaged with abstract 
properties.  
Based on these results, it appears that the prefrontal cortex may more generally support 
differing aspects of semantic processing depending on multiple factors.  As also indicated by the 
results of Experiment 1, the prefrontal cortex would seem to operate as a second stage in 
semantic decisions depending on the specific content and processing requirements. The results of 
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 this second experiment indicate that the verification of abstract semantic properties specifically 
involves regions of the prefrontal cortex irrespective of behavioral difficulty. As suggested in the 
primate literature, regions of the prefrontal cortex would seem contribute the specific rule-based 
properties necessary for some semantic decisions but not others. In this regard, semantic memory 
would appear to consist of a highly distributed but also interactive network of brain regions with 
both local and global contributions to the representation and processing of world knowledge. 
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 4. Summary and General Discussion 
Across the two presented experiments, the results suggest three main conclusions 
regarding the cortical distribution and interaction of semantic knowledge. First, perceptual 
properties of objects appear to specifically rely on sensory brain regions used to encode those 
properties. That is, the retrieval of perceptual knowledge associated with an object appears to 
depend on the simulation of prior sensory experiences with the object.  This result supports and 
extends perceptual symbol systems (Barsalou, 1999) and feature-based accounts for the cortical 
distribution of semantic memory (Martin & Chao, 2001) based on localized and specialized 
sensory regions in supporting perceptual properties of object knowledge. Domain-specific 
theories (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998), distributed representation accounts that assume no 
regional specializations (Tyler & Moss, 2001), and amodal representations (Caramazza et al., 
1990) encounter greater difficulty accounting for these findings in explaining the organization of 
semantic knowledge.   
Second, regions in the prefrontal cortex seem to specifically represent abstract properties 
of objects. These properties are likely coded in verbal terms and describe information about an 
object, in contrast to sensory-based representations of the object. This finding suggests a 
reconsideration of the role of the prefrontal cortex in semantic processing based on the 
abstractness of the task demands, either through a linguistic mediation of semantic processing 
(Noppeney & Price, 2004), especially when semantic associations become weaker (Wagner, 
2001), or through more general cognitive control operations (e.g., Thompson-Schill, 1997) more 
necessary in semantic contexts. In this regard, the increased reliance on prefrontal mechanisms 
may represent a second stage in semantic processing as predicted by seminal models either 
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 through the specific content required (Smith, Shoben, Rips, 1974; Armstrong, Gleitman, & 
Gleitman, 1983) or more general decision processes (McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1979). 
 Finally, the controlled processing of semantic knowledge appears to rely on prefrontal 
regions depending on the role of those regions in representing modality-specific and abstract 
properties, or in directing top-down bias signals to posterior cortical regions (Miller & Cohen, 
2001). Other prefrontal areas typically ascribed to more domain-general control functions 
(MacDonald et al., 2000, Schneider & Chein, 2003) would also seem to be involved in 
processing more difficult semantic decisions. This overall view suggests that semantic 
knowledge is distributed to specialized cortical regions based on the sensory modality involved 
and the abstractness of the semantic decision. In addition, semantic processing may be bound to 
more domain-general control operations with increasing demands of a given semantic decision. 
Prefrontal and sensory brain regions appear to interact to the extent that a given semantic 
decision becomes increasingly abstract and difficult, with specialized prefrontal regions 
supporting the different types of semantic processing based on the stimulus factors and decision 
context. How this distributed network interacts depending on multiple stimulus factors through 
specialized regions is the subject of much current debate regarding the role of the prefrontal 
cortex in cognitive control processes. Linguistic stimuli provide one way to characterize this 
executive control architecture while examining in detail how the prefrontal cortex, especially 
inferior regions, may fractionate based on the control mechanisms involved. 
The role of the prefrontal cortex in the processing of linguistic information illustrates the 
numerous factors that likely influence cognitive control in this region. As with other domains, 
regions in the prefrontal cortex may represent content specific to language or more general 
processing mechanisms may be more likely utilized in service of linguistic functions. For 
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 instance, some of the first neuroimaging investigations of cognition (Petersen et al., 1988, 1989) 
found LIPFC activity when subjects generated a verb to a target noun in contrast to when nouns 
were simply repeated. Yet the difficulty in determining exactly how these two tasks differ 
illustrates the problem of identifying the factors of cognitive control that influence prefrontal 
mechanisms. As indicated in the current studies, the modality-specificity and abstractness of the 
stimulus materials are just two of many possibilities that require further testing. 
The apparent material-specific delineation of anterior and posterior LIPFC regions arises 
from contrasts between phonological and semantic tasks (Bookheimer, 2002, Fiez, 1997, 
Gabrieli et al. 1998; though see Price et al., 1997), perhaps based on dedicated connections to 
posterior cortical areas (Gold & Buckner, 2002). Selective disruptions of these areas appear to 
specifically affect semantic and phonological decisions for word stimuli (Devlin et al., 2003). 
However, these results may more generally be explained in terms of the retrieval demands 
associated with each task (Barde & Thompson-Schill, 2002) rather than through domain-specific 
representations. Linguistic stimuli may be more likely to rely on these regions based on the 
specifics of naming items (Simons et al., 2001; Kan & Thomson-Schill, 2004) and in 
maintaining linguistic context (Kerns et al., 2004). Domain-general cognitive control 
mechanisms may be more likely to engage the LIPFC when linguistic tasks require sustained 
access to content in temporal regions (Noppeney, Phillips, & Price, 2004) and in suppressing 
irrelevant contextual information (Cardillo et al., 2004) 
While many studies have examined the role of the LIPFC in the controlled processing of 
semantic knowledge, its exact role remains unclear. Numerous investigators have proposed that 
this region specifically supports semantic working memory (Petersen et al., 1989, 1988; Kapur et 
al., 1994; Demb et al., 1995; Martin & Chao, 2001) reflecting the predicted control function for 
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 the prefrontal cortex more generally with different domains localized to distinct regions. The 
effect of reducing memory demands by presenting repetitive semantic information supports this 
interpretation. Semantic priming effects lead to decreasing activity in inferior prefrontal areas 
(Bookheimer, 2002) with common regions for pictures and words (Wagner et al., 1997) but also 
a task-specific fractionization of this region (Wagner et al., 2000). Control mechanisms in the 
LIPFC may become increasingly necessary as semantic relations between lexical items become 
weaker. To test this prediction, Wagner and colleagues (Wagner et al., 2001) examined activity 
in LIPFC while the associative strength between a cue and target item was varied. The results 
indicate that the LIPFC was activated moreso by weaker associates suggesting that this region 
mediates a top-down bias signal that is recruited when semantic processing requires controlled 
processing, as predicted for the prefrontal cortex more generally (Miller & Cohen, 2001). 
However weaker semantic associations likely require controlled processing of stimulus 
independent representations, such as abstract properties, when the required decision is unclear 
and multiple representations competing representations must be mediated. Recent evidence 
(Smith et al., 1998; Patalano et al., 2001) suggests that prefrontal cortex may specifically 
represent learned decision rules used in the service of task demands and in controlling prepotent 
tendencies, as the response properties of neurons in the primate analogue indicate (Wallis et al., 
2001). Category and property decisions that require access to such abstract semantic information 
specifically activate the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (Noppeney & Price, 2004) and the 
presented results similarly support this interpretation. 
 In addition to suggesting that specific types of properties are processed through 
prefrontal mechanisms, these regions may support more general control operations that 
dissociate based on input from posterior areas (Wilson et al., 1993; Romanski & Goldman-Rakic, 
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 2002). That is, rather than mediate semantic content per se, the prefrontal cortex may be more 
specifically involved in particular control functions such as the selection of task-relevant 
responses from among competing alternatives (Thompson-Schill et al. 1997, 1999). For instance, 
Thompson-Shill and colleagues (1997) varied semantic selection demands by manipulating the 
number of distracters in classification, comparison, as well as verb generation tasks. Items with 
many possible responses, in contrast with fewer possible alternatives, led to increased activity in 
the LIPFC irrespective of the task demands or stimulus type. Activations generally found in 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex during both classification and generation tasks further suggest the 
role of multiple generic control processes (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000) instead of specific types of 
representations. The present results support both material-specific and domain-general 
interpretations for the role of the prefrontal cortex in the representation and processing of 
semantic knowledge. Future studies, by controlling for the modality and abstractness of task 
demands, are likely to distinguish between these possibilities. 
  The results of the presented experiments support a feature-based reduction of semantic 
memory in which the knowledge of specific attributes of objects depends on brain regions 
specialized to represent and process those properties. In this regard, knowledge representation 
can be reduced to the constituent attributes of objects and the ways that particular aspects of 
objects are encoded. During perceptual experiences of objects, particular sensory brain 
mechanisms are used in processing the experience. For instance, in hearing a dog’s bark or a 
cat’s meow, sensory mechanisms in primary and secondary auditory must become active. The 
results indicate that recalling knowledge of these sounds involves increased activation of 
auditory brain regions. Similarly, visual, tactile, and gustatory knowledge of objects appear to 
rely on cortical regions specifically involved in encoding each of these sensory modalities. This 
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 direct perceptual knowledge of an object would therefore seem tied to the varied sensory 
experiences that gave rise to it, perhaps through increased specificity of object simulations with 
increased exposure to particular objects (Barsalou, 1999). 
In contrast, knowledge of objects can also be encoded more indirectly through the 
language system especially when multimodal, and summative, representations are required. A 
teacher, parent, friend, or even a book can describe objects in ways that induce the sensory 
representations of the object. However this verbal format can also provide new knowledge about 
an object that describes abstract properties and situational contexts that cannot be directly 
experienced. Scientific knowledge may therefore develop about objects in a way that describes 
properties that become associated with the representation of the object. For instance, the example 
of how biological knowledge develops again provides a useful focusing point. Young children 
are initially confused by the overt behavior of plants and non-living things such as a cloud, a 
truck, and a rock, concluding that the plants are not alive while the latter examples are alive. The 
difficulty for the child seems to involve learning to ignore the superficial perceptual features of 
objects in favor of underlying, and unseen, biological mechanisms and their associated, rule-
based, properties like those involving reproduction, growth, and eventually concepts of cellular 
division and genetics. Current feature-based models do not presently address the role of such 
features, or the cognitive control necessary to mediate them, in accessing semantic knowledge. 
The results suggest that the prefrontal cortex is specialized to the represent and process such 
abstract properties, and perhaps through a top-down modulation of processing of multiple 
modality-specific properties in posterior brain regions. Given the role of the prefrontal cortex in 
memory encoding and its delayed maturation relative to sensory regions (Diamond & Goldman-
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 Rakic, 1991), these anterior association areas would seem ideally suited to the representation and 
processing of abstract semantic knowledge as language develops. 
Based on seminal and contemporary categorization models, it should be no surprise that 
the brain takes advantage of feature similarity to ground the structure of particular categories. 
More difficult are borderline cases when it is not clear, from perceptual features alone, whether 
an item is a member of the given category. Consider for instance, whether an ‘apple’ (or still 
more difficult, your ‘ear’) is a living thing. If we were to simply group objects based on how they 
look, or even their near associates in semantic space (e.g., ‘pie’ or ‘sauce’), learning scientific 
concepts (i.e., ‘cell division’) would be trivial. However the conflict of perceptual features 
prevents easy categorization. For example, the neuropsychological and neuroimaging literatures 
have tended to treat the living/nonliving distinction as a rather obvious division of the world, 
even as one based on innate domain-based mechanisms. But for the young child this distinction 
is anything but simple. 
In a domain as perceptually diverse as biology (consider: ‘cow’, ‘daisy’, ‘wasp’, and 
‘amoeba’), children must begin to infer abstract causal mechanisms, and often without a firm 
perceptual grounding, to explain superficial similarities that are initially misleading, as in linking 
‘plants’ and ‘animals’ under the common category ‘living thing’ (Carey, 1985; Keil, 1989). The 
category of plants is so perceptually dissimilar from that of animals that young children initially 
claim that only animals are living things. The young child latches onto self-generated movement 
as a reliable cue as to whether something is alive (for a recent review see Gelman & Opfer, 
2002). Abstracting from visual input, and perhaps using simple functional features, would seem 
to require the acquisition and coordination of multimodal rules (e.g., all living things ‘die’ and 
‘reproduce’) with these perceptual cues. The young child will eventually need to explain outward 
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 movement in terms of an underlying biological mechanisms, and with a few years of experience 
and education they’ll attach concepts like ‘growth’, ‘nutrition’, and eventually ‘cell division’ to 
this skeletal structure. Likely, if you’re still struggling with whether an ‘apple’ is alive, you’ve 
seen that the similarity of perceptual features alone is not sufficient in drawing category 
boundaries, and thus you’ve been busy retrieving facts and concepts from semantic memory in a 
concerted effort to find the answer. Such information is crucial when deciding category 
membership for more borderline cases. The interaction between posterior and prefrontal brain 
regions may provide an instantiation of seminal two stage models of category structure and 
processing. The boundaries of a given category, especially with regard to borderline cases, are 
likely processed using areas in prefrontal cortex to control semantic retrieval and selection likely 
through the representation in these same areas of abstract properties. In this way, seminal two-
stage models would seem to be instantiated with posterior regions of cortex performing the 
general feature pattern match of the first stage, while more defining, and relational features are 
processed on-line as necessary to resolve more borderline decisions. 
Neuroimaging results of category-specific effects provide further support for the dissociation 
of semantic categories to particular regions of cortex. The form-function correlations that give 
rise to these effects are grounded in a highly distributed and overlapping cortical network 
reflecting vectors in, more specifically, a semantic feature space. The maximal activation of just 
one type of feature to a particular region is likely insufficient to capture the myriad of ways that 
semantic memory is coded. Recent neuroimaging work (Chao, Weisberg, & Martin, 2002) 
further supports the view that the content of category-related activations are based on specific 
sets of semantic features and mediated by the functional architecture of their near neighbors (i.e., 
the neural basis of conceptual similarity). Such results suggest that this distributed basis for 
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 knowledge representation is the direction of future neuroimaging investigations into semantic 
memory. For instance, the representation of an item and information about an item can differ 
significantly based on the surrounding context and goals (Barsalou, 1991). You might take a 
‘blanket’ to the beach as something to rest on, but its constituent functional use (i.e., to keep you 
warm) is the generally intended usage. In this regard, semantic knowledge is inherently flexible, 
depending on contextual circumstances and constraints. The processing of semantic features and 
their relations and extensions become crucially important in any attempt to understand the 
breadth and depth of semantic knowledge. 
In examining general theories of category structure and processing, the brain appears to make 
no clear distinction between perception and conception, as predicted by more recent 
categorization models (Goldstone & Barsalou, 1994). That is, semantic features would seem to 
be located in or near the sensory-motor areas of cortex in which the perceptual experiences were 
initially encoded, as predicted by the perceptual/functional hypothesis. Semantic categories, 
based on converging evidence from neuropsychology and neuroimaging, likely emerge from the 
feature intercorrelations that occur in processing similar items through shared cortical regions 
(Simmons & Barsaou, 2003). In addition, the breakdown patterns of some patients seem to 
further support this organization as prototypes remain somewhat intact (e.g., De Renzi & 
Lucchelli, 1994), even though distinguishing, and more peripheral features, are lost which would 
normally serve to differentiate near neighbors in semantic space. 
As a whole these neuroimaging results strongly suggest that, general semantic processing 
and, more specifically, conceptual knowledge of categories, such as animals and tools, is 
instantiated by distinct anatomical regions. In this regard, the neuroimaging of semantic memory 
provides support for the dissociations of category-specific deficits found in the 
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 neuropsychological literature. In addition these findings provide further support for recent 
proposals of perceptually-based symbols and the distinction between the representation of an 
object and information about it. This dissociation between perceptual features used in the direct 
experience of an object and abstract relational properties, coded in verbal terms, used to 
indirectly characterize an object, provides a further extension to current feature-based models. 
Categories of objects, and effects specific to them, can therefore arise from perceptual similarity 
and/or more abstract defining features based on the cortical distribution and interaction of 
semantic knowledge. 
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modality and difficulty-based regions at p < .01 (uncorrected). Listed are the approximate 
anatomical locations, Brodmann Areas (BA), and Talairach coordinates, as well as the number of 
voxels in each ROI and its average statistical value. 
 
Table 3: Design of Experiment 2 with verification questions.  
 
Table 4: Neuroimaging results of Experiment 2 based on a direct contrast between the semantic 
verification blocks and the nonword letter detection task at p < .05 (Bonferroni correction). 
Listed are the approximate anatomical locations, Brodmann Areas (BA), and Talairach 
coordinates, as well as the number of voxels in each ROI and its average statistical value.
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Table 1: Design of Experiment 1  
 
Questions: 
 
Does X look green? 
 
Does X sound loud? 
 
Does X feel soft? 
 
Does X taste sweet? 
 
 
 
Ea
sy
 
emerald thunder cotton caramel 
D
iff
ic
ul
ty
 
H
ar
d cabbage grenade flannel coconut 
GREEN? LOUD? SOFT? SWEET? 
Visual Auditory Tactile 
Olfactory/ 
Gustatory 
 
Sensory Modality 
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 Table 2: Neuroimaging results of Experiment 1  
 
Analysis Region BA Talairach Coordinates 
Voxel 
count p value
   x y  z    
Visual L Superior Parietal  7 -35 -71 45 125 0.001708
 L Middle Temporal 37 -52 -58 0 10 0.001662
 L Middle Temporal 37 -59 -46 -6 10 0.003038
       
Auditory L Superior Temporal Sulcus 22 / 42 -56 -48 7 39 0.002674
       
Tactile L Post-central Gyrus 2 / 40 -54 -33 34 83 0.002254
 L Pre-central Gyrus 4 / 6 -47 5 25 142 0.002449
 L Premotor 6 / 9 -34 29 20 165 0.002458
       
Gustatory L Inferior Frontal 11 / 12 -19 29 -7 5 0.002997
       
       
Hard L Dorsolateral Prefrontal 9 -50 11 31 75 0.004550
 Anterior Cingulate 32 -1 8 50 57 0.004098
 L Inferior Prefrontal 46 -41 32 11 42 0.004148
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 Table 3: Design of Experiment 2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ea
sy
 
Does X have four feet? Can X be trained? 
D
iff
ic
ul
ty
 
H
ar
d 
Does X have fur? Does X lay eggs? 
Sensory Abstract  
 
 Abstractness 
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 Table 4: Neuroimaging results of Experiment 2  
 
Analysis Region BA Talairach Coordinates 
Voxel 
count p value
   x y  z    
Words - Nonwords L Inferior Prefrontal Cortex 47 -31 35 0 25 5.44E-08
 L Inferior Prefrontal Cortex 47 -48 37 2 11 4.15E-07
    
 L Middle Frontal Gyrus 9 -44 21 32 56 2.14E-08
 L Middle Frontal Gyrus 10 -33 50 12 66 2.73E-08
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 FIGURE HEADINGS 
 
Figure 1: Average correct response times for each of the property verifications across the four 
sensory modalities and the letter detection control. 
 
Figure 2. Average correct response times for each of the property verifications across the four 
sensory modalities and divided by easy and hard trials defined a priori. 
 
Figure 3. Average correct response times for each of the property verifications across the four 
sensory modalities and segregated by easy and hard trials based on data from the neuroimaging 
participants. 
 
Figure 4. The visual property verification specifically activates the left ventral temporal cortex. 
 
Figure 5. The auditory property verification specifically activates the left superior temporal 
sulcus. 
 
Figure 6. The tactile property verification specifically activates regions in the left somatosensory, 
primary motor, and pre-motor cortices. 
 
Figure 7. The gustatory property verification specifically activates the left orbitofrontal cortex. 
 
Figure 8. The tactile and gustatory verifications specifically activate the left inferior prefrontal 
cortex irrespective of item difficulty.   
 
Figure 9. The left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex shows an interaction of the probed semantic 
modality and the difficulty of the presented items. 
 
Figure 10. The anterior cingulate cortex shows a main effect of response difficulty. 
 
Figure 11. Accuracy for verification questions based on rated abstractness and difficulty. 
 
Figure 12. Average correct response times to each of the verification questions based on rated 
abstractness and the average difficulty. 
 
Figure 13. The abstract verifications led to increased activity in a medial aspect of BA 47 of the 
LIPFC irrespective of response time. 
 
Figure 14. A lateral region in BA 47 of the LIPFC was responsive to both question abstractness 
and difficulty, though driven by the easier abstract verification. 
 
Figure 15. An anterior aspect of the left middle frontal gyrus responded most to the easier 
abstract verification suggesting a subnetwork based on some other semantic function. 
 
Figure 16. The left DLPFC was especially sensitive to item-property abstractness with no 
differences based on behavioral performance. 
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 APPENDIX A - Neuroimaging Methods 
 
 
The underlying temporal resolution of fMRI is limited by the hemodynamic response of 
the Blood Oxygen Level Dependent (BOLD) technique (Kwong et al., 1992; Bandettini et al., 
1992). BOLD is sensitive to changes in blood flow and oxygenation that typically develop in two 
seconds and peak in 5-7 seconds. The activation signals appear to be nearly linear and additive 
(Buckner et al., 1996; Dale & Buckner, 1997). The fMRI analysis is inherently a difference 
technique that requires a control and contrasting conditions. The MR signal is very 
heterogeneous across the cortex, with large variations in signal (e.g., between white matter and 
cerebral spinal fluid).  The small changes (e.g., 1%) in signal due to brain activation are typically 
revealed only after subtracting activation found in the visuo-motor control condition, though we 
expected main effects between semantic conditions with less than 1% signal change. The visuo-
motor control task was selected to enable us to factor out effects due to simply seeing a stimulus, 
selecting a decision, and making the appropriate motor response.  
The true benefit in using event-related designs is the ability to align the recorded 
behavioral and fMRI data on any stimulus or response event.  Events types (e.g., experimental 
and control, stimulus response, stimulus accuracy) can then be combined or subtracted.  
Statistical tests specify a temporal time window for assessing the significance of activation using 
GLM-based contrasts either between conditions or between the differences of each condition 
relative to a baseline (e.g., local baseline per stimulus period).  This produces a significance 
difference test for each voxel at typically 250,000 cortical points.   
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 APPENDIX B – Behavioral Norming Experiments 
 
 
For both of the presented experiments, norming experiments with behavioral-only 
subjects were used to: 1) identify verification questions that vary according to ‘abstractness’; 2) 
identify verification questions that vary according to ‘difficulty’ and to identify clear affirmative 
and negative items within each question; and 3) match each question for possibly confounding 
lexical factors. Each of these factors was computed in several groups (n = 23 - 30) of behavioral 
participants tested at separate times under speeded conditions at personal computer terminals. 
The procedures, as described below, within each norming experiment were held constant 
whereas norming tasks across stimulus dimensions were varied to control for the factor of 
interest. 
 
1) Rating item-property abstractness 
In order to be sure that Experiment 2 controlled for the differences between abstract and 
perceptual properties, and so that there was no abstractness difference between verification 
questions of Experiment 1, for all of the verification decisions presented in Experiments 1 and 2, 
behavioral participants were asked to rate the abstractness of item-property relations. Items were 
presented in sequences while the property was held constant with items and properties varying 
randomly. Participants were asked to rate, on a 5-point scale, whether they knew the item-
property relationship through sensory or abstract facts. The following instructions were read to 
every participant: 
In this experiment you will be asked to decide about how you know certain facts. Some facts can be known 
by having directly experienced them, whereas other facts are learned indirectly either through reading about 
them or being taught them. Sensory facts are facts that you know from seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, or 
touching things. For instance, the fact that most animals have eyes is obviously based on what the animal 
looks like. This is a sensory fact – that it can be readily learned from sensory experience. Abstract facts, on 
the other hand, are learned by either reading about them or by having been taught them. For instance, you 
113 
 know that all living things have cells. This is an abstract fact – that you must learn it indirectly either by 
reading about it or by being told it by someone else.  
  
Now, sensory and abstract facts may refer not only to things like ‘eyes’ and ‘liver’, but also to the relationship 
between a thing and its properties. For instance, whether a ‘tiger’ ‘has eyes’ is a sensory relationship. 
However, whether a ‘worm’ ‘has eyes’ is likely an abstract relationship, based on how you learned these 
facts. That is, it is not clear from how worms look whether they have eyes – you would have to learn this fact 
either through a book or another person and so it is an abstract fact.  
  
This experiment will ask you to judge the relationship between things and a given property, for example 
‘tiger’ and ‘has a liver’.  Your job will be to determine how you do, or would, know, whether an item has the 
given property based on a 5-point scale. If you know the item has the property from sensory experiences with 
the item, then this is a sensory relationship and you’ll press the #1 button.  If you know the item has the 
property from being taught the fact, then this is an abstract relationship and you’ll the #5 button. If you think 
your knowledge based somewhere exactly in between sensory and abstract facts, press the #3. However, try 
to go to one side with the #2 representing mostly sensory facts and the #4 representing mostly abstract facts. 
  
Keep in mind that you aren’t trying to answer whether the item has the property or not. You’re only 
indicating what type of facts, sensory or abstract, you would use to answer that question. So it’s not important 
whether a worm actually has eyes or not, only what types of facts you would use to arrive at the answer. 
  
Across three versions of this experiment, 15 properties, five in each version of the experiment, 
were tested where only they and the probed items varied. Some items were repeated multiple 
times across the set of tested properties but none were tested more than once for each property. 
Participants had 7 seconds to respond and were presented with between 700 and 800 trials in 
each version of the experiment. Any participant that responded in less than 500 ms for over 10% 
of trials was removed from further analysis. Based on this criterion, the data of 5 or 6 
participants was not included in the final behavioral norms, which were based on data from 17 to 
20 participants.  
The results of this experiment produced verification questions that ranged on this 
abstractness scale, across all presented items, from 1.75 (tastes sweet) to 4.10 (has a liver). By 
including and excluding items from the set presented in the respective neuroimaging 
experiments, it was possible to match the verification questions on this dimension for 
Experiment 1 and to vary the questions on this factor for Experiment 2.  
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 2) Verifying properties to items 
To be sure that no items were particularly difficult within each verification question of 
Experiments 1 and 2, all questions were piloted with a superset of items used in the 
neuroimaging experiments. This testing of the stimulus materials replicated the overall procedure 
and design of the neuroimaging experiments with behavioral-only participants told to verify 
whether each presented items possessed the given property. Across participants, average 
response times and the average response, affirmative or negative, for each item was computed 
within each verification decision. These scores were then used eliminate items judged 
inconsistently and to match affirmative and negative items within each property as well as to 
match for these factors across the set of questions. In the regard, this data was used to generate 
easy and hard items within the modality-based property verifications of Experiment 1 and to 
control easy and hard verification questions for Experiment 2. 
 
3) Attributing lexical status to items 
 The lexical familiarity measure was calculated from response times and accuracy 
patterns of behavioral-only participants when the items are presented in a lexical decision 
experiment. This effort has aimed to derive a direct empirical measure for how well word items 
are known, in contrast to text-driven frequency estimates (Francis & Kucera, 1982), which are 
susceptible to corpora selection bias and inconsistencies between how words are used in speech 
and in print. Lexical decision data for about 30 subjects for over 600 words have been 
transformed into a standardized z-space that represents a word familiarity index. This index 
reflects the ease with which participants ascribe lexical status (e.g., ‘algae’ = -1.15 whereas 
‘apple’ = +1.05 – with the most positive being responding to very quickly and very accurately) 
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 and therefore empirically controls for how well a given word stimulus is known. Our previous 
neuroimaging efforts have used this measure to more strongly rule out lexical factors, like 
familiarity or letter length, in activation differences.  
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 APPENDIX C – Items used in Experiments 1 and 2 
 
Key. 
 
Affirmative – Items to which a ‘yes’ response was required 
Negative – Items to which a ‘no’ response was required 
Stimulus – Items used in the block 
Familiarity – Lexical familiarity score derived from response times and accuracy for the item when 
presented in a lexical decision experiment. 
Letters – Number of letters in the item 
Syllables – Number of syllables in, or phonological length of, the item 
Response – Average response given, where yes = 1 and no = 2, when item was verified for the property 
by the behavioral-only participants. 
RT - Average response time for the item when the property is verified by the behavioral-only participants. 
Abstract - Average abstractness rating for the item-property relationship, from 1 to 5 where 1 is based on 
sensory facts and 5 is based on abstract facts. 
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 Experiment 1 items. Visual modality (Looks Green?) 
Green  Stimulus Familiarity Letters Syllables Response RT Abstract
1 basil -0.12 5 2 1.20 696.80 1.50
2 celery 0.26 6 3 1.00 706.68 1.15
3 crocodile 0.27 9 3 1.04 686.24 1.30
4 cucumber 0.34 8 3 1.08 647.38 1.20
5 emerald 0.04 7 3 1.04 687.67 1.50
6 lettuce 0.45 7 2 1.00 661.48 1.20
7 lizard 0.69 6 2 1.04 699.24 1.20
8 mint 0.21 4 1 1.08 664.72 1.65
9 parsley -0.09 7 2 1.00 688.32 1.70
10 seaweed 0.26 7 2 1.04 692.24 1.45
11 spinach 0.21 7 2 1.08 701.24 1.05
Easy  
Affirmative 
 
12 turtle 0.61 6 2 1.04 696.12 1.05
1 cabbage 0.57 7 2 1.17 726.29 1.15
2 cactus 0.12 6 2 1.08 744.63 1.25
3 dill -0.05 4 1 1.32 909.56 1.65
4 fungus 0.20 6 2 1.16 732.96 2.25
5 grasshopper 0.29 11 3 1.00 710.12 1.10
6 lime 0.65 4 1 1.04 744.88 1.05
7 marijuana 0.10 9 4 1.12 886.52 1.45
8 moss -0.16 4 1 1.08 750.44 1.55
9 olive 0.82 5 2 1.24 799.08 1.55
10 sage 0.13 4 1 1.28 799.68 2.32
11 spearmint -0.01 9 2 1.00 768.76 1.65
Hard 
Affirmative  
12 vine 0.26 4 1 1.16 787.96 1.40
1 butter 0.39 6 2 2.00 628.60 2.05
2 cheese 0.32 6 1 2.00 672.96 1.9
3 cherry 0.80 6 2 2.00 673.67 1.55
4 cinnamon 0.28 8 3 2.00 738.52 2.3
5 coffee 0.32 6 2 2.00 614.64 2.15
6 crab 0.73 4 1 2.00 662.52 1.95
7 egg 0.24 3 1 1.96 698.20 1.8
8 nutmeg -0.01 6 2 2.00 727.64 2.45
9 rose 0.57 4 1 2.00 722.88 1.65
10 tiger 0.53 5 2 2.00 672.22 1.7
11 wheat 0.28 5 1 2.00 673.84 2.1
Easy 
Negative 
12 zebra 0.29 5 2 2.00 632.83 1.8
1 apricot 0.03 7 3 1.88 743.71 1.55
2 garlic 0.35 6 2 1.72 841.48 1.85
3 ginger 0.17 6 2 1.80 839.84 2.35
4 grape 0.77 5 1 1.72 811.20 1.55
5 mango 0.50 5 2 1.84 771.80 1.85
6 mushroom 0.75 8 2 2.00 750.48 1.7
7 nectarine -1.02 9 3 1.96 749.04 1.5
8 panther 0.53 7 2 1.96 771.52 1.9
9 pepper 0.35 6 2 1.78 767.78 1.75
10 radish -0.17 6 2 1.84 804.76 1.5
11 tick -0.10 4 1 1.96 794.00 3
Hard 
Negative 
12 tulip 0.01 5 2 1.88 779.50 1.7
Easy Avg   0.33 5.96 1.96 1.53 681.11 1.64
Hard Avg   0.21 6.13 1.92 1.50 782.75 1.69
Modality Avg   0.27 6.04 1.94 1.51 731.93 1.66
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 Auditory modality (Sounds Loud?) 
Loud  Stimulus Familiarity Letters Syllables Response RT Abstract
1 ambulance 0.24 9 3 1.00 754.74 1.35
2 bomb 0.86 4 1 1.04 702.59 2.59
3 dynamite 0.32 8 3 1.04 659.52 2.82
4 jet 0.72 3 1 1.00 697.20 1.53
5 missile -0.13 7 2 1.04 694.33 2.76
6 motorcycle 0.51 10 4 1.04 711.07 1.25
7 rocket 0.21 6 2 1.07 715.85 2.56
8 saxophone 0.09 9 3 1.07 765.85 1.53
9 shotgun 0.68 7 2 1.00 705.30 2.06
10 stereo 0.24 6 3 1.15 741.78 1.18
11 thunder 0.60 7 2 1.00 685.41 1.29
Easy  
Affirmative 
 
12 trombone -0.63 8 2 1.00 708.70 1.76
1 bazooka -0.66 7 3 1.15 794.78 2.71
2 blender 0.45 7 2 1.30 865.07 1.53
3 cannon 0.19 6 2 1.15 776.11 2.56
4 car 0.85 3 1 1.26 801.22 1.76
5 drill 0.61 5 1 1.26 798.19 1.65
6 grenade -1.18 7 2 1.11 768.26 3.00
7 guitar 0.46 6 2 1.11 772.52 1.35
8 hairdryer 0.06 9 3 1.22 803.07 1.41
9 rifle -0.16 5 2 1.04 775.69 2.00
10 train 0.87 5 1 1.11 770.93 1.59
11 tuba 0.50 4 2 1.00 780.37 1.35
Hard 
Affirmative  
12 vacuum 0.02 6 2 1.11 788.37 1.24
1 chair 0.81 5 1 1.96 664.00 2.18
2 sink 0.70 4 1 2.00 693.00 2.29
3 pencil 0.90 6 2 1.96 707.04 2.29
4 ruler -0.18 5 2 2.00 712.22 2.65
5 glass 0.32 5 1 1.96 715.50 2.59
6 rope 0.66 4 1 2.00 717.00 2.35
7 pen 0.90 3 1 1.96 731.63 1.94
8 knife 0.80 5 1 1.93 732.93 2.41
9 stick 0.48 5 1 2.00 745.67 2.35
10 plate 0.51 5 1 1.96 700.77 2.88
11 oven 0.70 4 2 1.92 755.00 2.12
Easy 
Negative 
12 scissors 0.36 8 2 1.96 765.15 2.06
1 pan 0.48 3 1 1.96 771.74 2.24
2 belt 0.79 4 1 1.96 793.96 2.41
3 bicycle 0.62 7 3 1.96 794.74 2.00
4 axe 0.31 3 1 1.81 815.26 2.25
5 microwave 0.06 9 3 1.70 837.74 1.53
6 grill 0.56 5 1 1.88 919.58 2.00
7 refrigerator -0.10 12 5 1.77 910.92 1.65
8 clock 0.70 5 1 1.69 865.65 2.06
9 stream 0.42 6 1 1.92 868.23 2.00
10 stove 0.62 5 1 1.93 880.48 2.00
11 scooter 0.24 7 2 1.77 882.15 2.12
Hard 
Negative 
12 wagon 0.34 5 2 1.85 864.56 2.24
Easy Avg   0.44 5.96 1.83 1.50 715.93 2.12
Hard Avg   0.29 5.88 1.88 1.50 820.82 1.94
Modality Avg   0.37 5.92 1.85 1.50 768.37 2.03
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 Tactile modality (Feels Soft?) 
Tactile  Stimulus Familiarity Letters Syllables Response 
1 cheek 0.37 5 787.12 1.29
2 cheetah 0.04 7 732.73 2.76
3 cotton 0.28 6 665.04 1.59
4 fleece 0.32 6 771.89 1.47
5 lion 0.76 4 730.31 2.41
6 rabbit 1.04 6 702.74 1.18
7 satin 0.13 5 688.15 1.18
8 silk 0.21 4 1.00 723.15 1.12
9 squirrel 0.56 8
Easy  
Affirmative 
 
RT Abstract 
1 1.12 
2 1.12 
2 1.00 
1 1.00 
2 1.23 
2 1.04 
2 1.04 
1
2 1.07 769.11 2.24
10 suede -0.42 5 1 1.07 751.11 1.41
velvet 0.28 6 2 1.04 685.70 1.41
0.29 5 2 1.19 771.04 2.59
0.67 6 1 1.20 821.24 1.24
-0.20 8 2 1.04 810.81 1.41
-0.60 8 3 1.40 873.56 1.35
0.70 3 1 1.31 814.31 2.00
0.13 4 1 1.04 816.81 1.35
0.10 7 2 1.15 819.52 1.29
0.21 7 2 1.19 794.48 2.82
0.79 4 1 1.19 809.69 1.88
0.45 5 1 1.19 890.48 1.71
-0.01 5 2 1.19 832.85 1.53
0.10 9 4 1.31 910.77 1.65
Hard 
Affirmative  
0.53 5 2 1.19 810.74 2.88
aluminum 0.24 8 4 1.93 684.56 2.82
bronze 0.28 6 1 1.96 696.77 3.06
diamond 0.89 7 3 1.93 710.44 2.65
glass 0.32 5 1 2.00 734.92 1.59
granite 0.24 7 2 2.00 728.74 2.82
marble 0.32 6 2 1.93 705.07 2.47
pebble -0.04 6 2 1.96 734.04 1.71
platinum 0.17 8 3 1.96 690.85 3.18
rock 0.77 4 1 1.96 713.30 1.65
silver 0.28 6 2 2.00 706.23 2.71
11 steel 0.35 5 1 2.00 673.22 2.65
Easy 
12 tooth 0.79 5 1 1.96 741.37 1.71
1 bone 0.58 4 1 1.96 748.33 2.53
2 boulder -0.58 7 2 2.00 744.44 2.24
3 cricket 0.61 7 2 2.00 752.63 3.06
4 crystal 0.39 7 2 1.96 765.74 2.35
5 elbow 0.39 5 2 1.89 849.44 1.59
6 elephant 0.55 8 3 1.81 872.35 2.53
7 forehead 0.35 8 2 1.65 846.88 1.53
8 hip 0.59 3 1 1.77 811.62 1.47
9 pearl 0.21 5 1 1.88 827.00 2.12
10 sapphire 0.06 8 2 2.00 800.26 3.29
11 
12 zebra 
1 breast 
2 cashmere 
3 corduroy 
4 cow 
5 felt 
6 flannel 
7 giraffe 
8 goat 
9 horse 
10 linen 
11 polyester 
12 tiger 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Negative 7 
8 
9 
10 
Hard 
Negative 
11 shoulder  0.38 9 2 1.81 834.19 1.38
12 vinyl 0.06 5 2 1.77 926.58 1.24
Easy Avg   0.32 5.87 1.79 1.52 722.06 2.06
Hard Avg   0.27 6.13 1.83 1.54 824.36 1.93
Modality Avg   0.29 6.00 1.81 1.53 773.21 2.00
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 Gustatory modality (Tastes Sweet?) 
Sweet  Stimulus Familiarity Letters Syllables Response RT Abstract 
1 caramel 0.24 7 3 1.04 718.25 1.10
2 cherry 0.80 6 2 1.00 642.84 1.50
3 cookie 0.24 6 2 1.04 677.33 1.25
4 fudge 0.35 5 1 1.08 658.04 1.30
5 juice 0.24 5 1 1.04 670.67 1.75
6 kiwi -0.73 4 2 1.17 647.08 1.35
7 lemonade 0.28 8 3 1.16 715.60 1.25
8 melon 0.57 5 2 1.08 685.17 1.35
9 papaya -0.65 6 3 1.39 710.48 2.05
10 pop 0.13 3 1 1.08 688.60 1.32
11 raspberry 0.50 9 2 1.17 678.92 1.45
Easy  
Affirmative 
 
12 taffy -0.01 5 2 1.17 660.83 1.35
1 banana 0.67 6 3 1.12 723.04 1.40
2 cider 0.17 5 2 1.24 778.64 1.20
3 cocoa 0.13 5 2 1.17 771.00 1.45
4 coconut 0.52 7 3 1.21 753.92 1.25
5 cream 0.17 5 1 1.32 739.86 1.55
6 gum 0.28 3 1 1.08 744.04 1.00
7 licorice -0.12 8 3 1.20 837.96 1.55
8 margarita 0.17 9 4 1.40 894.08 1.65
9 raisin 0.04 6 2 1.28 758.60 1.25
10 toffee -0.38 6 2 1.28 835.36 1.25
11 truffle -0.16 7 2 1.25 806.13 1.85
Hard 
Affirmative  
12 yogurt 0.13 6 2 1.21 728.00 1.45
1 basil -0.12 5 2 2.00 616.38 2.45
2 cabbage 0.57 7 2 1.88 651.21 1.70
3 carrot 0.93 6 2 1.96 678.72 1.75
4 garlic 0.35 6 2 1.92 666.33 1.90
5 lemon 0.77 5 2 1.64 714.32 1.35
6 lettuce 0.45 7 2 1.92 692.96 1.60
7 olive 0.82 5 2 1.92 650.76 1.60
8 parsley -0.09 7 2 1.96 699.92 2.30
9 radish -0.17 6 2 1.96 684.91 2.10
10 salsa 0.17 5 2 1.92 709.24 1.70
11 spinach 0.21 7 2 1.96 671.24 1.65
Easy 
Negative 
12 walnut 0.32 6 2 1.88 707.88 1.75
1 almond 0.24 6 2 1.76 752.96 1.60
2 butter 0.39 6 2 1.64 794.16 1.75
3 cashew 0.10 6 2 1.83 808.42 1.50
4 cheese 0.32 6 1 1.92 763.20 1.60
5 coffee 0.32 6 2 1.80 803.76 1.95
6 ginger 0.17 6 2 1.75 797.29 2.00
7 nutmeg -0.01 6 2 1.79 848.17 2.05
8 pecan -0.09 5 2 1.68 798.72 1.60
9 pretzel 0.39 7 2 1.79 783.04 1.90
10 rum 0.43 3 1 1.75 762.17 1.80
11 squash 0.54 6 1 1.92 734.08 1.85
Hard 
Negative 
12 tomato 0.51 6 3 1.91 746.83 1.75
Easy Avg   0.26 5.88 2.00 1.51 679.07 1.62
Hard Avg   0.20 5.92 2.04 1.51 781.81 1.59
Modality Avg   0.23 5.90 2.02 1.51 730.44 1.61
121 
 Experiment 2 items.  
Easy Perceptual verification (Has Four Feet?) 
Four Feet  Stimulus Familiarity Letters Syllables Response RT Abstract
1 bear 0.87 4 1 1.00 660.78 1.35
2 buffalo 0.73 7 3 1.00 669.52 1.47
3 bull 0.28 4 1 1.00 673.41 1.47
4 cat 0.94 3 1 1.00 683.70 1.29
5 cheetah 0.04 7 2 1.00 638.22 1.35
6 cougar 0.29 6 2 1.04 657.56 1.41
7 coyote 0.70 6 3 1.00 634.59 1.59
8 deer 0.46 4 1 1.04 613.30 1.35
9 dog 1.02 3 1 1.00 628.52 1.29
10 donkey 0.67 6 2 1.04 703.56 1.41
11 elephant 0.55 8 3 1.00 701.93 1.35
12 giraffe 0.21 7 2 1.08 666.54 1.47
13 goat 0.79 4 1 1.07 645.52 1.35
14 horse 0.45 5 1 1.04 629.89 1.29
15 jaguar 0.24 6 2 1.00 649.22 1.41
16 leopard 0.45 7 2 1.00 660.00 1.47
17 lion 0.76 4 2 1.00 592.74 1.53
18 llama -0.48 5 2 1.04 658.26 1.47
19 mule 0.66 4 1 1.00 675.56 1.47
20 panther 0.53 7 2 1.04 639.89 1.53
21 sheep 1.05 5 1 1.04 640.26 1.35
22 tiger 0.53 5 2 1.00 649.30 1.35
23 wolf 0.64 4 1 1.00 649.22 1.35
Affirmative  
24 zebra 0.29 5 2 1.04 650.70 1.35
         
1 canary 0.19 6 3 2.00 703.48 2.00
2 cardinal 0.31 8 3 2.00 718.23 1.71
3 crow 0.84 4 1 1.96 704.59 1.65
4 dolphin 0.68 7 2 2.00 650.11 2.65
5 dove 0.48 4 1 1.93 703.74 1.47
6 eagle 0.81 5 2 1.96 630.33 1.94
7 falcon -0.19 6 2 1.96 688.93 1.88
8 hawk 0.11 4 1 2.00 721.59 2.00
9 hummingbird 0.05 11 3 2.00 689.23 2.12
10 ostrich -0.26 7 2 2.00 713.85 1.47
11 owl 0.32 3 1 1.92 671.85 2.24
12 parakeet -1.33 8 3 1.96 697.30 1.59
13 parrot 0.58 6 2 1.96 659.15 2.00
14 pigeon 0.36 6 2 1.96 694.96 1.94
15 raven -0.12 5 2 1.96 706.04 1.71
16 robin 0.69 5 2 1.93 654.07 1.71
17 seagull 0.49 7 2 2.00 693.81 2.18
18 shark 0.82 5 1 1.96 702.81 2.47
19 sparrow -0.07 7 2 1.96 718.35 2.24
20 starfish 0.47 8 2 2.00 694.12 2.94
21 stork -0.42 5 1 2.00 701.15 1.82
22 swordfish 0.18 9 2 2.00 660.63 2.81
23 trout 0.08 5 1 1.96 679.22 2.24
Negative  
24 vulture -0.21 7 2 2.00 704.81 1.88
Total Avg.   0.36 5.71 1.79 1.50 671.55 1.72
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 Hard Perceptual Verification (Has Fur?) 
 
Fur  Stimulus Familiarity Letters Syllables Response RT Abstract
1 antelope -0.17 8 3 1.15 874.19 1.88
2 ape 0.44 3 1 1.07 795.15 1.65
3 beaver 0.52 6 2 1.07 766.15 1.53
4 boar -0.05 4 1 1.22 827.44 1.71
5 buffalo 0.73 7 3 1.11 736.37 1.65
6 bull 0.28 4 1 1.22 794.85 1.59
7 chimpanzee 0.22 10 3 1.04 814.00 1.47
8 donkey 0.67 6 2 1.19 748.96 1.29
9 elk -0.01 3 1 1.16 753.68 1.76
10 gazelle -0.54 7 2 1.39 834.91 1.59
11 giraffe 0.21 7 2 1.04 787.19 1.71
12 goat 0.79 4 1 1.08 763.19 1.29
13 horse 0.45 5 1 1.19 791.15 1.29
14 hyena -1.98 5 3 1.04 763.96 1.65
15 kangaroo 0.13 8 3 1.07 751.56 1.47
16 lamb 0.86 4 1 1.00 768.11 1.24
17 lynx -0.93 4 1 1.19 807.19 1.75
18 monkey 0.89 6 2 1.15 738.74 1.47
19 mouse 0.91 5 1 1.07 779.63 1.35
20 mule 0.66 4 1 1.11 770.81 1.82
21 puma -0.38 4 2 1.12 751.00 1.88
22 sheep 1.05 5 1 1.04 745.41 1.29
23 skunk 0.27 5 1 1.11 769.59 1.35
Affirmative  
24 zebra 0.29 5 2 1.07 744.63 1.53
         
1 canary 0.19 6 3 1.96 762.30 2.13
2 cardinal 0.31 8 3 1.96 708.41 1.94
3 chicken 0.87 7 2 1.85 753.26 1.82
4 crocodile 0.27 9 3 2.00 717.11 2.59
5 dove 0.48 4 1 1.96 738.85 2.00
6 duck 0.76 4 1 1.93 744.41 1.65
7 eagle 0.81 5 2 1.96 773.26 1.59
8 elephant 0.55 8 3 1.77 858.69 1.76
9 falcon -0.19 6 2 1.96 821.70 2.12
10 goose 0.20 5 1 1.93 739.85 1.82
11 grasshopper 0.29 11 3 2.00 724.74 2.41
12 hen 0.27 3 1 1.92 775.69 1.59
13 hippopotamus -0.30 12 5 1.81 876.33 2.00
14 lizard 0.69 6 2 2.00 718.33 2.06
15 owl 0.32 3 1 1.88 758.92 1.76
16 parrot 0.58 6 2 1.96 702.19 1.76
17 penguin 0.55 7 2 1.96 716.33 1.94
18 pig 0.92 3 1 1.67 829.52 1.82
19 robin 0.69 5 2 1.89 773.89 2.06
20 rooster 0.39 7 2 1.93 715.15 1.71
21 seagull 0.49 7 2 2.00 748.67 2.00
22 swan -0.22 4 1 1.96 754.63 1.76
23 turkey 0.88 6 2 2.00 829.11 1.88
Negative 
24 vulture -0.21 7 2 1.93 715.00 2.06
Total Avg.   0.31 5.79 1.88 1.52 769.46 1.74
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 Easy Abstract Verification (Can be Trained?) 
 
Train  Stimulus Familiarity Letters Syllables Response RT Abstract
1 ape 0.44 3 1 1.16 737.84 2.45
2 cat 0.94 3 1 1.17 715.71 2.25
3 cheetah 0.04 7 2 1.40 733.04 3.60
4 chimpanzee 0.22 10 3 1.17 682.63 2.47
5 cougar 0.29 6 2 1.32 755.32 3.60
6 cow 0.70 3 1 1.39 782.17 3.20
7 dog 1.02 3 1 1.08 578.63 2.25
8 dolphin 0.68 7 2 1.12 739.96 2.75
9 donkey 0.67 6 2 1.32 762.88 3.05
10 elephant 0.55 8 3 1.32 805.96 3.30
11 goat 0.79 4 1 1.33 718.00 3.20
12 gorilla 0.24 7 3 1.28 714.24 2.55
13 horse 0.45 5 1 1.04 696.35 2.60
14 kangaroo 0.13 8 3 1.40 735.76 3.45
15 leopard 0.45 7 2 1.32 743.96 3.30
16 lion 0.76 4 2 1.32 683.56 2.70
17 monkey 0.89 6 2 1.09 702.39 2.45
18 mule 0.66 4 1 1.24 716.28 3.45
19 parakeet -1.33 8 3 1.32 809.80 2.85
20 parrot 0.58 6 2 1.22 684.74 2.65
21 pig 0.92 3 1 1.36 784.32 3.05
22 rabbit 1.04 6 2 1.25 701.88 3.30
23 tiger 0.53 5 2 1.28 720.96 2.65
Affirmative  
24 whale 0.77 5 1 1.36 804.12 3.55
         
1 ant 0.73 3 1 1.88 621.72 4.30
2 antelope -0.17 8 3 1.63 702.54 3.45
3 beetle 0.54 6 2 1.88 682.44 4.10
4 centipede -0.53 9 3 1.87 703.52 4.32
5 cockroach -0.25 9 2 1.88 677.00 4.40
6 coyote 0.70 6 3 1.65 684.78 3.70
7 crab 0.73 4 1 1.91 703.91 4.10
8 flea 0.39 4 1 1.84 672.88 4.10
9 hornet 0.31 6 2 1.88 660.20 4.30
10 maggot 0.20 6 2 1.96 674.96 4.20
11 mosquito 0.27 8 3 1.92 688.75 4.25
12 moth -0.23 4 1 1.88 696.75 4.25
13 pigeon 0.36 6 2 1.61 668.04 3.40
14 raccoon 0.27 7 2 1.61 696.00 3.70
15 salmon 0.41 6 2 1.83 710.29 4.25
16 shark 0.82 5 1 1.75 713.42 3.45
17 shrimp 0.94 6 1 1.88 691.60 4.45
18 spider 0.56 6 2 1.75 703.83 4.10
19 starfish 0.47 8 2 1.84 664.08 4.30
20 termite 0.20 7 2 1.92 696.24 4.20
21 tick -0.10 4 1 1.83 680.75 4.40
22 trout 0.08 5 1 1.88 658.50 4.15
23 tuna 0.85 4 2 1.83 680.75 4.30
Negative 
24 wasp -0.01 4 1 1.96 698.30 4.35
Total Avg.   0.38 5.80 1.86 1.55 710.63 3.54
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 Hard Abstract Verification (Lays Eggs?) 
 
Eggs  Stimulus Familiarity Letters Syllables Response RT Abstract
1 alligator 0.50 9 4 1.22 838.04 3.06
2 ant 0.73 3 1 1.33 853.96 3.82
3 bee 0.73 3 1 1.23 843.08 3.65
4 cricket 0.61 7 2 1.22 807.78 4.00
5 flea 0.39 4 1 1.19 768.41 3.41
6 hornet 0.31 6 2 1.27 820.31 3.65
7 jellyfish 0.60 9 2 1.35 880.35 3.76
8 ladybug 0.18 7 3 1.24 783.92 3.65
9 lizard 0.69 6 2 1.15 844.85 3.29
10 lobster 0.68 7 2 1.19 961.93 3.76
11 mackerel -1.23 8 3 1.24 910.88 4.00
12 mosquito 0.27 8 3 1.19 881.44 3.71
13 moth -0.23 4 1 1.22 874.96 3.65
14 octopus 0.26 7 3 1.38 991.42 3.53
15 owl 0.32 3 1 1.38 780.42 3.18
16 salamander -0.69 10 4 1.19 893.33 3.47
17 shark 0.82 5 1 1.36 829.12 3.53
18 shrimp 0.94 6 1 1.19 870.27 3.82
19 spider 0.56 6 2 1.15 853.19 3.29
20 starfish 0.47 8 2 1.21 834.67 3.47
21 stingray -0.97 8 2 1.27 1009.96 3.93
22 termite 0.20 7 2 1.19 819.65 4.12
23 tuna 0.85 4 2 1.15 792.08 3.41
Affirmative  
24 wasp -0.01 4 1 1.22 867.93 3.35
         
1 bear 0.87 4 1 1.96 771.19 3.41
2 beaver 0.52 6 2 1.93 767.04 3.12
3 boar -0.05 4 1 1.96 755.50 3.18
4 buffalo 0.73 7 3 1.93 752.07 3.24
5 cheetah 0.04 7 2 1.88 745.72 3.12
6 chipmunk 0.11 8 2 1.88 856.08 3.47
7 dog 1.02 3 1 1.93 738.48 3.35
8 dolphin 0.68 7 2 1.74 880.89 3.82
9 elk -0.01 3 1 1.92 767.50 3.12
10 gazelle -0.54 7 2 1.81 807.52 3.29
11 jaguar 0.24 6 2 1.96 768.78 3.59
12 lamb 0.86 4 1 1.89 767.78 3.12
13 leopard 0.45 7 2 1.93 741.07 3.29
14 llama -0.48 5 2 1.92 762.04 3.24
15 lynx -0.93 4 1 1.93 775.19 3.12
16 mouse 0.91 5 1 1.92 870.96 3.24
17 mule 0.66 4 1 1.96 768.56 3.24
18 puma -0.38 4 2 1.93 812.33 3.35
19 raccoon 0.27 7 2 1.96 784.52 3.53
20 skunk 0.27 5 1 1.89 725.19 3.65
21 squirrel 0.56 8 2 1.81 800.73 3.35
22 tiger 0.53 5 2 1.96 731.33 3.35
23 whale 0.77 5 1 1.78 917.56 3.71
Negative 
24 zebra 0.29 5 2 1.96 814.70 3.29
Total Avg.   0.30 5.81 1.81 1.57 822.81 3.47
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